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Consider a Version of the Tragedy of the Commons in Which

Question 9

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Consider a version of the Tragedy of the Commons in which herder 1 and 2 simultaneously choose to graze quantities of sheep Consider a version of the Tragedy of the Commons in which herder 1 and 2 simultaneously choose to graze quantities of sheep And ,respectively,and in which the payoff functions are For 1 and For 2.The Nash equilibrium is A) 100. B) 60. C) 40. D) 33.3. And Consider a version of the Tragedy of the Commons in which herder 1 and 2 simultaneously choose to graze quantities of sheep And ,respectively,and in which the payoff functions are For 1 and For 2.The Nash equilibrium is A) 100. B) 60. C) 40. D) 33.3.,respectively,and in which the payoff functions are Consider a version of the Tragedy of the Commons in which herder 1 and 2 simultaneously choose to graze quantities of sheep And ,respectively,and in which the payoff functions are For 1 and For 2.The Nash equilibrium is A) 100. B) 60. C) 40. D) 33.3.For 1 and Consider a version of the Tragedy of the Commons in which herder 1 and 2 simultaneously choose to graze quantities of sheep And ,respectively,and in which the payoff functions are For 1 and For 2.The Nash equilibrium is A) 100. B) 60. C) 40. D) 33.3.For 2.The Nash equilibrium is Consider a version of the Tragedy of the Commons in which herder 1 and 2 simultaneously choose to graze quantities of sheep And ,respectively,and in which the payoff functions are For 1 and For 2.The Nash equilibrium is A) 100. B) 60. C) 40. D) 33.3.


A) 100.
B) 60.
C) 40.
D) 33.3.

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