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In the Separating Equilibrium of the Spence Education Signaling Game

Question 18

Multiple Choice

In the separating equilibrium of the Spence education signaling game in which the high type gets an education,which is a true statement about the firm's posterior belief that the worker who shows up with no education is the low type?


A) In the separating equilibrium of the Spence education signaling game in which the high type gets an education,which is a true statement about the firm's posterior belief that the worker who shows up with no education is the low type? A) B) C) D)
B) In the separating equilibrium of the Spence education signaling game in which the high type gets an education,which is a true statement about the firm's posterior belief that the worker who shows up with no education is the low type? A) B) C) D)
C) In the separating equilibrium of the Spence education signaling game in which the high type gets an education,which is a true statement about the firm's posterior belief that the worker who shows up with no education is the low type? A) B) C) D)
D) In the separating equilibrium of the Spence education signaling game in which the high type gets an education,which is a true statement about the firm's posterior belief that the worker who shows up with no education is the low type? A) B) C) D)

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