Question 1

The strategy of tit-for-tat is

Accepted Answer

A) to cooperate for the first interaction, and to defect for each subsequent interaction. 
B) to cooperate for the first interaction, and to imitate your rival's behavior in each subsequent interaction. 
C) to defect for the first interaction, and to cooperate for each subsequent interaction. 
D) to always be the first one to defect.

Question 2

The conditions discussed by Axelrod show that in the tit-for-tat strategy

Accepted Answer

A) people are most likely to defect. 
B) people always cooperate. 
C) people cooperate most of the time but defect under certain conditions. 
D) in trench warfare, defection is the usual practice.

Question 3

In evolutionary models, where each individual reproduces in proportion to its average payoff, and if defectors working with cooperators get higher returns than cooperators working together, and if cooperators and defectors look exactly alike, then

Accepted Answer

A) cooperators are destined for extinction. 
B) defectors are destined for extinction. 
C) an equilibrium will result with more than half of the population being cooperators. 
D) there will be no change in the population proportions from the starting point.

Question 4

In a prisoner's dilemma game, a dominant strategy would mean that one of the players

Accepted Answer

A) follows the moves of the opponent no matter what the opponent does. 
B) knows the payoff matrix outcomes while the other does not. 
C) is sure to come out with the most preferred outcome no matter what the other does. 
D) will benefit most from one particular move no matter what the opponent does.

Question 5

In a society consisting of 75% cooperators and 25% defectors, with an 8-unit payoff to a cooperator who interacts with another cooperator and a 0-unit payoff to the cooperator who interacts with a defector, if the cost of scrutiny is 2, the cooperator

Accepted Answer

A) should pay the cost of scrutiny even if it were 3. 
B) should not interact with either cooperators or defectors. 
C) should not pay the cost of scrutiny. 
D) will break even by paying the cost of scrutiny.

Question 6

In a management class there are two types of students, the individualists and the socialites. There is a group term project that is worked on jointly but then individually summarized and handed in for a grade. When individualists end up in the same group, they all get B- since they are not very inclined to share their insights with each other. When the socialites work together, they all get A- because they learn from each other and have more to say when they each write up a report. When individualists and socialites work in a group, the individualists learn from the socialites but share little, so the individualists get an A and the socialites get a
C.The students with the best grades are the ones who stay on in school.From this information answer the following questions.If the teacher allows the students to pick their team partners without a grade penalty, what will the population of the class eventually become? Draw a payoff graph again showing this outcome.

Accepted Answer

The answer of In a management class there are two...

Question 7

One difficulty is that tit-for-tat's effectiveness depends on the existence of

Accepted Answer

A) perfect information about another's actions. 
B) only two players in the game. 
C) an infinite number of players in the game. 
D) an industry that is not growing.

Question 8

In the payoff matrix below, the Nash equilibrium for the game is

Accepted Answer

A)  for both players to follow strategy A. 
B)  for both players to follow strategy B. 
C)  for player 2 to follow strategy A and for player 2 to follow strategy B. 
D)  There is no Nash equilibrium in this game

Question 9

This question refers to the payoff matrix below where profits for United Airlines and American airlines are shown for alternative pricing strategies. The airlines can either hold prices where they are or engage in price cutting activity.

&emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp;  &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; $\text { United } $
$\begin{array}{l}
\begin{array} { l } 
\
\text {American} & \text {  hold rates}\
\
 & \text { cut rates}
\end{array}
\begin{array} { l } 
\hline \text { hold rates } & \text { cut rates } \
\hline \mathrm{U}=100 & \mathrm{U}=160 \
\mathrm{~A}=100 & \mathrm{~A}=60 \
\hline \mathrm{U}=80 & \mathrm{U}=70 \
\mathrm{~A}=150 & \mathrm{~A}=70
\end{array}
\end{array}$
 Does either airline have a dominant strategy? If so, what is it?

Accepted Answer

The answer of This question refers to the payoff matrix...

Question 10

In a battle of Boeing and Airbus, a Nash equilibrium will exist if

Accepted Answer

A) they both have agreed to a monopoly pricing structure. 
B) they are presently operating at a point where neither one would benefit by unilaterally changing strategies. 
C) Boeing has the power to drive Airbus out of business with a predatory pricing strategy. 
D) both pass up profit opportunities because they fear retaliation.

Question 11

Your text suggests that cigarette companies advertise too much. This is because they

Accepted Answer

A) do not know what the payoff options are. 
B) seek to convince customers to switch brands and they have a dominant strategy to advertise in this case. 
C) are pursuing a tit-for-tat strategy and are engaged in destructive behavior. 
D) make the most money collectively if they advertise and increase the total market.

Question 12

The prisoner's dilemma exercise assumes

Accepted Answer

A) prisoners are rational. 
B) prisoners are altruistic to each other if they know each other well. 
C) prisoners believe other prisoners are different then they themselves are. 
D) prisoners do not know what the penalties are when they are interrogated.

Question 13

The hawks and doves example illustrated in the textbook shows that an important property of evolution by natural selection is that traits are often favored by their effects

Accepted Answer

A) on individual payoffs. 
B) on population payoffs. 
C) regardless of the payoffs. 
D) and not on the costs to obtain those traits.

Question 14

In sequential game strategies, each player could avoid the worst case outcomes by

Accepted Answer

A) assuming that the other player will always rationally avoid its worst case outcome. 
B) pursuing a strategy that leads toward the highest end point gains possible. 
C) pursuing a strategy that leads in the direction of the worst case scenario. 
D) the strategies listed in both assuming that the other player will always rationally avoid its worst case outcome and pursuing a strategy that leads toward the highest end point gains possible because they will definitely keep one from the worst case scenario.

Question 15

In sequential games

Accepted Answer

A) players move at the same time. 
B) the order of moves matter. 
C) the order of the moves is irrelevant. 
D) there is always two Nash equilibriums.

Question 16

The unraveling problem in interdependent relationships arises from a situation in which

Accepted Answer

A) there is a known, finite number of future interactions. 
B) there is not a known, finite number of future interactions. 
C) interactions suddenly and surprisingly cease. 
D) a recession hits an industry.

Question 17

In game theory, a player following a maximum strategy

Accepted Answer

A) picks the strategy with the best of all the worst possible outcomes. 
B) picks the strategy with the highest payoff from all the options. 
C) is indifferent to all strategies so a strategy is picked randomly. 
D) is altruistic and picks a strategy that maximizes the other players' outcome.

Question 18

A tit for tat strategy has the best chance of working if

Accepted Answer

A) a transaction is a one-time event. 
B) the interaction between participants is frequent and open-ended. 
C) the interaction is frequent, but has a specific end date. 
D) neither side in the interaction trusts the other's commitment to the strategy.

Question 19

The hawks and doves example illustrated in the textbook show how the usefulness of a certain mode of behavior depends on

Accepted Answer

A) the frequency with which others also prefer that behavior. 
B) the frequency of that behavior. 
C) the scarcity of resources available. 
D) the number of doves at any moment.

Question 20

This question refers to the payoff matrix below where profits for United Airlines and American airlines are shown for alternative pricing strategies. The airlines can either hold prices where they are or engage in price cutting activity.

&emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp;  &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; &emsp; $\text { United } $
$\begin{array}{l}
\begin{array} { l } 
\
\text {American} & \text {  hold rates}\
\
 & \text { cut rates}
\end{array}
\begin{array} { l } 
\hline \text { hold rates } & \text { cut rates } \
\hline \mathrm{U}=100 & \mathrm{U}=160 \
\mathrm{~A}=100 & \mathrm{~A}=60 \
\hline \mathrm{U}=80 & \mathrm{U}=70 \
\mathrm{~A}=150 & \mathrm{~A}=70
\end{array}
\end{array}$
 Is there a Nash equilibrium?

Accepted Answer

The answer of This question refers to the payoff matrix...

Exam 12: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Strategic Behavior

The strategy of tit-for-tat is

The conditions discussed by Axelrod show that in the tit-for-tat strategy

In evolutionary models, where each individual reproduces in proportion to its average payoff, and if defectors working with cooperators get higher returns than cooperators working together, and if cooperators and defectors look exactly alike, then

In a prisoner's dilemma game, a dominant strategy would mean that one of the players

In a society consisting of 75% cooperators and 25% defectors, with an 8-unit payoff to a cooperator who interacts with another cooperator and a 0-unit payoff to the cooperator who interacts with a defector, if the cost of scrutiny is 2, the cooperator

One difficulty is that tit-for-tat's effectiveness depends on the existence of

In the payoff matrix below, the Nash equilibrium for the game is

In a battle of Boeing and Airbus, a Nash equilibrium will exist if

Your text suggests that cigarette companies advertise too much. This is because they

The prisoner's dilemma exercise assumes

The hawks and doves example illustrated in the textbook shows that an important property of evolution by natural selection is that traits are often favored by their effects

In sequential game strategies, each player could avoid the worst case outcomes by

In sequential games

The unraveling problem in interdependent relationships arises from a situation in which

In game theory, a player following a maximum strategy

A tit for tat strategy has the best chance of working if

The hawks and doves example illustrated in the textbook show how the usefulness of a certain mode of behavior depends on