Jaheim and Suzanna Are Playing a Game Involving Repeated Iterations

Multiple Choice

Jaheim and Suzanna are playing a game involving repeated iterations of a simultaneous-move prisoner's dilemma.In each round,both players choose either "cooperate" or "defect." Neither Jaheim nor Suzanna knows when the game will end.If Jaheim believes that Suzanna will be playing tit for tat,then

A) he will maximize his payoffs by defecting in every round.
B) cooperation will be impossible to maintain regardless of the strategy he plays.
C) cooperation might be possible if he also plays tit for tat.
D) cooperation might be possible if he plays a strategy where he defects in every round.
E) cooperation might be possible if he plays a strategy where he defects in the first round,cooperates in the second round,and defects in every other round.