Multiple Choice
The general message of the folk theorems is that
A) Nash equilibria may not be sustainable over many replications of a game.
B) Payoffs that are unambiguously preferred to Nash equilibria may be sustainable over many replications of a game.
C) Credible threats may inhibit the achievement of mutually beneficial outcomes over many replications of a game.
D) Just plain folk play the best games.
Correct Answer:

Verified
Correct Answer:
Verified
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