Multiple Choice
Which of the following is a true statement about signaling games?
A) In a separating equilibrium,the second mover's posterior beliefs are the same as his priors.
B) In a separating equilibrium,Bayes' rule cannot be used to compute posterior beliefs (because it produces an undefined answer) .
C) In a pooling equilibrium,both the first and second movers choose the same action.
D) In a pooling equilibrium,the second mover learns nothing from the first mover's action.
Correct Answer:

Verified
Correct Answer:
Verified
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