Exam 15: William L Rowe: the Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism

In this selection, Rowe presents his own version of the argument from evil: 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 3. [Therefore] there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. Concerning premise 2, Rowe declares, "In light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." -Rowe thinks that instances of intense suffering exist that an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without losing some greater good or causing some evil equally bad or worse.

In this selection, Rowe presents his own version of the argument from evil: 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 3. [Therefore] there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. Concerning premise 2, Rowe declares, "In light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." -Rowe believes there are no theist responses to his argument from evil.

In this selection, Rowe presents his own version of the argument from evil: 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 3. [Therefore] there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. Concerning premise 2, Rowe declares, "In light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." -Rowe's argument from evil is based on

In this selection, Rowe presents his own version of the argument from evil: 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 3. [Therefore] there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. Concerning premise 2, Rowe declares, "In light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." -Rowe acknowledges that the case of the fawn's apparently pointless suffering does not prove that premise 1 of his argument is true.

In this selection, Rowe presents his own version of the argument from evil: 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 3. [Therefore] there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. Concerning premise 2, Rowe declares, "In light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." -Rowe's conclusion is that a finite God does not exist.

In this selection, Rowe presents his own version of the argument from evil: 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 3. [Therefore] there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. Concerning premise 2, Rowe declares, "In light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." -Rowe considers himself a "friendly atheist."

In this selection, Rowe presents his own version of the argument from evil: 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 3. [Therefore] there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. Concerning premise 2, Rowe declares, "In light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." -Rowe thinks that theism cannot be accepted on rational grounds by theists.

In this selection, Rowe presents his own version of the argument from evil: 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 3. [Therefore] there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. Concerning premise 2, Rowe declares, "In light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." -Rowe takes human and animal suffering as a clear instance of evil.

In this selection, Rowe presents his own version of the argument from evil: 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 3. [Therefore] there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. Concerning premise 2, Rowe declares, "In light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." -Rowe asks if it is reasonable to believe that there is some greater good so intimately connected to that suffering [of the fawn] that even an omnipotent, omniscient being could not have obtained that good without permitting that suffering or some evil at least as bad. His answer is that

In this selection, Rowe presents his own version of the argument from evil: 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 3. [Therefore] there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. Concerning premise 2, Rowe declares, "In light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." -For Rowe, the dying fawn in the forest is a case of unnecessary, unexplained evil in the world.

In this selection, Rowe presents his own version of the argument from evil: 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 3. [Therefore] there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. Concerning premise 2, Rowe declares, "In light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." -Rowe identifies himself as "an unfriendly atheist."

In this selection, Rowe presents his own version of the argument from evil: 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 3. [Therefore] there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. Concerning premise 2, Rowe declares, "In light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." -Rowe claims that we can have rational grounds for believing that