Exam 40: JJC Smart: Sensations and Brain Processes

In this selection Churchland examines functionalism and the two prominent versions of materialism in philosophy of mind. Reductivism claims that there is an identity of mental states with brain states. Functionalism rejects any one-to-one correlation between mental types and physical types and concentrates on the relationship between inputs and outputs. For example, the mental event of pain could be similar in two beings that have altogether different types of bodies and brains. Most functionalists are materialists, but someone could be a functionalist and be a nonmaterialist. Eliminative materialism is more radical than either of these other theories and seeks to eliminate "folk psychology"-talk of beliefs, feelings, and perceptions-in favor of more scientific descriptions of what is going on in the brain. Churchland concludes that the truth may be a combination of the two materialist theories, although the evidence points more in the direction of eliminativism. -In Smart's view, there are no brain processes.

In this selection Churchland examines functionalism and the two prominent versions of materialism in philosophy of mind. Reductivism claims that there is an identity of mental states with brain states. Functionalism rejects any one-to-one correlation between mental types and physical types and concentrates on the relationship between inputs and outputs. For example, the mental event of pain could be similar in two beings that have altogether different types of bodies and brains. Most functionalists are materialists, but someone could be a functionalist and be a nonmaterialist. Eliminative materialism is more radical than either of these other theories and seeks to eliminate "folk psychology"-talk of beliefs, feelings, and perceptions-in favor of more scientific descriptions of what is going on in the brain. Churchland concludes that the truth may be a combination of the two materialist theories, although the evidence points more in the direction of eliminativism. -Smart's theory posits a kind of property dualism.

In this selection Churchland examines functionalism and the two prominent versions of materialism in philosophy of mind. Reductivism claims that there is an identity of mental states with brain states. Functionalism rejects any one-to-one correlation between mental types and physical types and concentrates on the relationship between inputs and outputs. For example, the mental event of pain could be similar in two beings that have altogether different types of bodies and brains. Most functionalists are materialists, but someone could be a functionalist and be a nonmaterialist. Eliminative materialism is more radical than either of these other theories and seeks to eliminate "folk psychology"-talk of beliefs, feelings, and perceptions-in favor of more scientific descriptions of what is going on in the brain. Churchland concludes that the truth may be a combination of the two materialist theories, although the evidence points more in the direction of eliminativism. -Smart argues that an after-image is a brain process.

In this selection Churchland examines functionalism and the two prominent versions of materialism in philosophy of mind. Reductivism claims that there is an identity of mental states with brain states. Functionalism rejects any one-to-one correlation between mental types and physical types and concentrates on the relationship between inputs and outputs. For example, the mental event of pain could be similar in two beings that have altogether different types of bodies and brains. Most functionalists are materialists, but someone could be a functionalist and be a nonmaterialist. Eliminative materialism is more radical than either of these other theories and seeks to eliminate "folk psychology"-talk of beliefs, feelings, and perceptions-in favor of more scientific descriptions of what is going on in the brain. Churchland concludes that the truth may be a combination of the two materialist theories, although the evidence points more in the direction of eliminativism. -Smart contends that mental states are identical to physical brain states.

In this selection Churchland examines functionalism and the two prominent versions of materialism in philosophy of mind. Reductivism claims that there is an identity of mental states with brain states. Functionalism rejects any one-to-one correlation between mental types and physical types and concentrates on the relationship between inputs and outputs. For example, the mental event of pain could be similar in two beings that have altogether different types of bodies and brains. Most functionalists are materialists, but someone could be a functionalist and be a nonmaterialist. Eliminative materialism is more radical than either of these other theories and seeks to eliminate "folk psychology"-talk of beliefs, feelings, and perceptions-in favor of more scientific descriptions of what is going on in the brain. Churchland concludes that the truth may be a combination of the two materialist theories, although the evidence points more in the direction of eliminativism. -Smart denies that "experience" and "brain process"

In this selection Churchland examines functionalism and the two prominent versions of materialism in philosophy of mind. Reductivism claims that there is an identity of mental states with brain states. Functionalism rejects any one-to-one correlation between mental types and physical types and concentrates on the relationship between inputs and outputs. For example, the mental event of pain could be similar in two beings that have altogether different types of bodies and brains. Most functionalists are materialists, but someone could be a functionalist and be a nonmaterialist. Eliminative materialism is more radical than either of these other theories and seeks to eliminate "folk psychology"-talk of beliefs, feelings, and perceptions-in favor of more scientific descriptions of what is going on in the brain. Churchland concludes that the truth may be a combination of the two materialist theories, although the evidence points more in the direction of eliminativism. -Smart ultimately rejects mind-body identity.

In this selection Churchland examines functionalism and the two prominent versions of materialism in philosophy of mind. Reductivism claims that there is an identity of mental states with brain states. Functionalism rejects any one-to-one correlation between mental types and physical types and concentrates on the relationship between inputs and outputs. For example, the mental event of pain could be similar in two beings that have altogether different types of bodies and brains. Most functionalists are materialists, but someone could be a functionalist and be a nonmaterialist. Eliminative materialism is more radical than either of these other theories and seeks to eliminate "folk psychology"-talk of beliefs, feelings, and perceptions-in favor of more scientific descriptions of what is going on in the brain. Churchland concludes that the truth may be a combination of the two materialist theories, although the evidence points more in the direction of eliminativism. -Smart says the notion that everything should be explicable in terms of physics except the occurrence of sensations seems

In this selection Churchland examines functionalism and the two prominent versions of materialism in philosophy of mind. Reductivism claims that there is an identity of mental states with brain states. Functionalism rejects any one-to-one correlation between mental types and physical types and concentrates on the relationship between inputs and outputs. For example, the mental event of pain could be similar in two beings that have altogether different types of bodies and brains. Most functionalists are materialists, but someone could be a functionalist and be a nonmaterialist. Eliminative materialism is more radical than either of these other theories and seeks to eliminate "folk psychology"-talk of beliefs, feelings, and perceptions-in favor of more scientific descriptions of what is going on in the brain. Churchland concludes that the truth may be a combination of the two materialist theories, although the evidence points more in the direction of eliminativism. -Smart says that the well-known philosophical objections to the mind-body identity theory are

In this selection Churchland examines functionalism and the two prominent versions of materialism in philosophy of mind. Reductivism claims that there is an identity of mental states with brain states. Functionalism rejects any one-to-one correlation between mental types and physical types and concentrates on the relationship between inputs and outputs. For example, the mental event of pain could be similar in two beings that have altogether different types of bodies and brains. Most functionalists are materialists, but someone could be a functionalist and be a nonmaterialist. Eliminative materialism is more radical than either of these other theories and seeks to eliminate "folk psychology"-talk of beliefs, feelings, and perceptions-in favor of more scientific descriptions of what is going on in the brain. Churchland concludes that the truth may be a combination of the two materialist theories, although the evidence points more in the direction of eliminativism. -Smart says that because neurons are not in physical space and a brain process is, a neuron is not in physical space.

In this selection Churchland examines functionalism and the two prominent versions of materialism in philosophy of mind. Reductivism claims that there is an identity of mental states with brain states. Functionalism rejects any one-to-one correlation between mental types and physical types and concentrates on the relationship between inputs and outputs. For example, the mental event of pain could be similar in two beings that have altogether different types of bodies and brains. Most functionalists are materialists, but someone could be a functionalist and be a nonmaterialist. Eliminative materialism is more radical than either of these other theories and seeks to eliminate "folk psychology"-talk of beliefs, feelings, and perceptions-in favor of more scientific descriptions of what is going on in the brain. Churchland concludes that the truth may be a combination of the two materialist theories, although the evidence points more in the direction of eliminativism. -In Smart's view, there are no sensations.

In this selection Churchland examines functionalism and the two prominent versions of materialism in philosophy of mind. Reductivism claims that there is an identity of mental states with brain states. Functionalism rejects any one-to-one correlation between mental types and physical types and concentrates on the relationship between inputs and outputs. For example, the mental event of pain could be similar in two beings that have altogether different types of bodies and brains. Most functionalists are materialists, but someone could be a functionalist and be a nonmaterialist. Eliminative materialism is more radical than either of these other theories and seeks to eliminate "folk psychology"-talk of beliefs, feelings, and perceptions-in favor of more scientific descriptions of what is going on in the brain. Churchland concludes that the truth may be a combination of the two materialist theories, although the evidence points more in the direction of eliminativism. -Smart says that sensations are independent of brain processes.

In this selection Churchland examines functionalism and the two prominent versions of materialism in philosophy of mind. Reductivism claims that there is an identity of mental states with brain states. Functionalism rejects any one-to-one correlation between mental types and physical types and concentrates on the relationship between inputs and outputs. For example, the mental event of pain could be similar in two beings that have altogether different types of bodies and brains. Most functionalists are materialists, but someone could be a functionalist and be a nonmaterialist. Eliminative materialism is more radical than either of these other theories and seeks to eliminate "folk psychology"-talk of beliefs, feelings, and perceptions-in favor of more scientific descriptions of what is going on in the brain. Churchland concludes that the truth may be a combination of the two materialist theories, although the evidence points more in the direction of eliminativism. -The identity theory has trouble explaining how "mind" and brain interact.