Exam 21: Asymmetric Information
Exam 1: Introduction58 Questions
Exam 2: Supply and Demand77 Questions
Exam 3: Balancing Benefits and Costs70 Questions
Exam 4: Consumer Preferences71 Questions
Exam 5: Constraints, Choices, and Demand74 Questions
Exam 6: Demand and Welfare74 Questions
Exam 7: Technology and Production72 Questions
Exam 8: Cost72 Questions
Exam 9: Profit Maximization72 Questions
Exam 10: Choices Involving Time72 Questions
Exam 11: Choices Involving Risk58 Questions
Exam 12: Choices Involving Strategy62 Questions
Exam 13: Behavioral Economics57 Questions
Exam 14: Equilibrium and Efficiency57 Questions
Exam 15: Market Intervention58 Questions
Exam 16: General Equilibrium, Efficiency, and Equity57 Questions
Exam 17: Monopoly62 Questions
Exam 18: Pricing Policies57 Questions
Exam 19: Oligopoly62 Questions
Exam 20: Externalities and Public Goods62 Questions
Exam 21: Asymmetric Information65 Questions
Select questions type
Adverse selection occurs when an informed individual is ________ willing to trade in situations that make trading ________ to an uninformed trading partner.
Free
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(38)
Correct Answer:
B
Figure 21.2 shows the benefit functions for low-ability workers and high-ability workers (A and B),along with one indifference curve for each worker type (C and D).The employer cannot observe worker type directly but has created two positions,E and F,as a screening mechanism.Which of the following is true? 

Free
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(32)
Correct Answer:
B
Which of the following explains why a compensation contract designed to combat employee moral hazard that features strong incentives might be worse than having no incentive scheme at all?
Free
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(41)
Correct Answer:
C
In an insurance market,________ occurs when one type of policy generates losses,while another type of policy generates profits,and all policies collectively break even.
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(35)
Explain the differences and similarities between screening and signaling.Is one better than the other?
(Essay)
4.7/5
(28)
Figure 21.2 shows the benefit functions for low-ability workers and high-ability workers (A and B),along with one indifference curve for each worker type (C and D).The employer cannot observe worker type directly but has created two positions,E and F,as a screening mechanism.Which of the following is true? 

(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(32)
________ has occurred if the manager of a firm takes an action that furthers her own interests at the expense of the firm's profits.
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(37)
If a person takes a costly action simply to influence others' beliefs then this person is engaged in what economists call:
(Multiple Choice)
5.0/5
(31)
George Akerloff theorized that adverse selection in the used car market could be so bad that the market completely unravels and no good used cars are offered for sale.But,of course,there probably are some good used cars offered for sale in real used car markets.What methods have developed in the used car market to overcome this problem of asymmetric information and to prevent market unraveling?
(Essay)
4.8/5
(18)
Which of the following is NOT a potential source of incentives covered in the textbook?
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(34)
A salesperson works for a car dealership for 40 hours per week,but may choose not to work hard all of the time.The dealership's owner cannot observe the salesperson's effort,but can observe the number of cars sold.The salesperson's personal cost of working at the dealership is C(H)= 1,200 + H2,where H is the number of hours during which he works hard.The corresponding marginal cost of effort is MC = 2H.Without any effort,the salesperson will,on average,generate a profit of $1,200.With each hour of high effort,he has a 5 percent chance of selling a car.Each car sale generates a profit of $900.Suppose the owner gives the salesperson $1,200 in base pay plus a bonus of $500 for each car he sells.How many hours of hard work will the salesperson choose?
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(37)
Suppose all workers in a certain labor market are of either high quality or low quality.Potential employers value a high-quality worker at $15,000 per month and a low-quality worker at $7,500 per month.The monthly supply of high-quality workers is QsH = 0.04(W - 1,500)and the supply of low-quality workers is QsL = 0.08(W - 1,500),where W is the monthly wage.If workers' abilities are not observable to employers,what is the equilibrium wage?
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(33)
The indifference curves in Figure 21.1 slope upward because: 

(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(30)
When analyzing cases of signaling,economists tend to focus their attention primarily on:
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(26)
Adverse selection can drive good used cars from the market because:
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(26)
A salesperson works for a car dealership for 40 hours per week,but may choose not to work hard all of the time.The dealership's owner cannot observe the salesperson's effort,but can observe the number of cars sold.The salesperson's personal cost of working at the dealership is C(H)= 1,200 + H2,where H is the number of hours during which he works hard.The corresponding marginal cost of effort is MC = 2H.Without any effort,the salesperson will,on average,generate a profit of $1,200.With each hour of high effort,he has a 5 percent chance of selling a car.Each car sale generates a profit of $900.What is the efficient number of hours of hard work?
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(30)
Suppose all workers in a certain labor market are of either high quality or low quality.Potential employers value a high-quality worker at $15,000 per month and a low-quality worker at $7,500 per month.The monthly supply of high-quality workers is QsH = 0.04(W - 1,500)and the supply of low-quality workers is QsL = 0.08(W - 1,500),where W is the monthly wage.If workers' abilities are observable to employers,what are the equilibrium wages?
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(22)
The value of a worker's marginal product is $50 per hour for high-ability workers and $15 per hour for low-ability workers.The preferences of high-ability workers correspond to the utility function UH(E,W)= W - 4E,and the preferences of low-ability workers correspond to the utility function UL(E,W)= W - 10E.By law,everyone is required to attend at least ten years of school.Three-fifths of the population has low ability,and two-fifths has high ability.What is the most efficient separating equilibrium?
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(37)
When one party to a transaction takes actions that a trading partner cannot observe but that nonetheless affect that trading partner,this is called:
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(25)
Showing 1 - 20 of 65
Filters
- Essay(0)
- Multiple Choice(0)
- Short Answer(0)
- True False(0)
- Matching(0)