Exam 21: Asymmetric Information
Exam 1: Introduction58 Questions
Exam 2: Supply and Demand77 Questions
Exam 3: Balancing Benefits and Costs70 Questions
Exam 4: Consumer Preferences71 Questions
Exam 5: Constraints, Choices, and Demand74 Questions
Exam 6: Demand and Welfare74 Questions
Exam 7: Technology and Production72 Questions
Exam 8: Cost72 Questions
Exam 9: Profit Maximization72 Questions
Exam 10: Choices Involving Time72 Questions
Exam 11: Choices Involving Risk58 Questions
Exam 12: Choices Involving Strategy62 Questions
Exam 13: Behavioral Economics57 Questions
Exam 14: Equilibrium and Efficiency57 Questions
Exam 15: Market Intervention58 Questions
Exam 16: General Equilibrium, Efficiency, and Equity57 Questions
Exam 17: Monopoly62 Questions
Exam 18: Pricing Policies57 Questions
Exam 19: Oligopoly62 Questions
Exam 20: Externalities and Public Goods62 Questions
Exam 21: Asymmetric Information65 Questions
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The problem of adverse selection was first studied by economist ________ who showed how it can undermine the possibilities for trade in the market for _______.
(Multiple Choice)
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A salesperson works for a car dealership for 40 hours per week,but may choose not to work hard all of the time.The dealership's owner cannot observe the salesperson's effort,but can observe the number of cars sold.The salesperson's personal cost of working at the dealership is C(H)= 1,200 + H2,where H is the number of hours during which he works hard.The corresponding marginal cost of effort is MC = 2H.Without any effort,the salesperson will,on average,generate a profit of $1,200.With each hour of high effort,he has a 5 percent chance of selling a car.Each car sale generates a profit of $900.How much surplus does the relationship generate?
(Multiple Choice)
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Explain in your own words how the government can create Pareto efficiency by mandating participation in a social health insurance program.
(Essay)
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The requirement by some life insurance companies that applicants must undergo medical examinations is an attempt on the part of the life insurance company to mitigate the problem of adverse selection by:
(Multiple Choice)
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Private organizations,such as Consumer Reports,are able to earn a profit by serving as quality certifiers because:
(Multiple Choice)
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When one party to a transaction has more information about the characteristics of the good or service to be trade than does the other party,economists say that information is:
(Multiple Choice)
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Suppose all workers in a certain labor market are of either high quality or low quality.Potential employers value a high-quality worker at $15,000 per month and a low-quality worker at $7,500 per month.The monthly supply of high-quality workers is QsH = 0.04(W - 1,500)and the supply of low-quality workers is QsL = 0.08(W - 1,500),where W is the monthly wage.If workers' abilities are not observable to employers,what is the deadweight loss due to asymmetric information?
(Multiple Choice)
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Suppose all workers in a certain labor market are of either high quality or low quality.Potential employers value a high-quality worker at $15,000 per month and a low-quality worker at $7,500 per month.The monthly supply of high-quality workers is QsH = 0.04(W - 1,500)and the supply of low-quality workers is QsL = 0.08(W - 1,500),where W is the monthly wage.If workers' abilities are observable to employers,how many workers of each type do employers hire?
(Multiple Choice)
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If Vincent van Gogh cut off his ear to demonstrate his love for someone,this would be an example of:
(Multiple Choice)
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In many cases,signaling offers a partial solution to problems that arise from:
(Multiple Choice)
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Government intervention is frequently justified in insurance markets due to the presence of market failures caused by:
(Multiple Choice)
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One way to confront an individual employee with the full benefits and costs of their actions is through:
(Multiple Choice)
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Figure 21.2 shows the benefit functions for low-ability workers and high-ability workers (A and B),along with one indifference curve for each worker type (C and D).The employer cannot observe worker type directly but has created two positions,E and F,as a screening mechanism.The equilibrium shown here is: 

(Multiple Choice)
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If in the model for educational attainment among workers a pooling equilibrium emerges then workers' choices about education send:
(Multiple Choice)
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The value of a worker's marginal product is $50 per hour for high-ability workers and $15 per hour for low-ability workers.The preferences of high-ability workers correspond to the utility function UH(E,W)= W - 4E,and the preferences of low-ability workers correspond to the utility function UL(E,W)= W - 10E.By law,everyone is required to attend at least ten years of school.Three-fifths of the population has low ability,and two-fifths has high ability.Would it be Pareto efficient for the government to ban schooling beyond 10 years rather than allow a separating equilibrium?
(Multiple Choice)
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In situations where there is a potential for moral hazard,the increased efficiency achieved through incentive schemes is:
(Multiple Choice)
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Moral hazard occurs if one party to a transaction takes actions that the trading partner ________ and that ________ the benefits the trading partner receives from the trade.
(Multiple Choice)
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When employers use screening to distinguish high-ability workers from sufficiently numerous low-ability workers,the burden of asymmetric information falls on _________ because they ________ than when employers are well-informed.
(Multiple Choice)
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The individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act is a means of preventing:
(Multiple Choice)
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