Exam 16: Alternative Exit and Restructuring Strategies: Divestitures, spin-Offs, carve-Outs, split-Ups, and Split-Offs

Although the parent retains control,the shareholder base of the subsidiary that has undergone an equity carve-out is unlikely to be different than that of the parent as a result of the public sale of equity.

When a firm is unable to pay its liabilities as they come due,it is said to be in bankruptcy.

The parent firm generally retains control of the business involved in an equity carve-out.

Unlike a spin-off or carve-out,the parent retains complete ownership of the business for which it has created a tracking stock.

Which of the following is not true of a spin-off?

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Motorola Bows to Activist Pressure Under pressure from activist investor Carl Icahn, Motorola felt compelled to make a dramatic move before its May 2008 shareholders' meeting. Icahn had submitted a slate of four directors to replace those up for reelection and demanded that the wireless handset and network manufacturer take actions to improve profitability. Shares of Motorola, which had a market value of $22 billion, had fallen more than 60% since October 2006, making the firm's board vulnerable in the proxy contest over director reelections. Signaling its willingness to take dramatic action, Motorola announced on March 26, 2008, its intention to create two independent, publicly traded companies. The two new companies would consist of the firm's former Mobile Devices operation (including its Home Devices businesses consisting of modems and set-top boxes) and its Enterprise Mobility Solutions & Wireless Networks business. In addition to the planned spin-off, Motorola agreed to nominate two people supported by Carl Icahn to the firm's board. Originally scheduled for 2009, the breakup was postponed due to the upheaval in the financial markets that year. The breakup would result in a tax-free distribution to Motorola's shareholders, with shareholders receiving shares of the two independent and publicly traded firms. The Mobile Devices business designs, manufactures, and sells mobile handsets globally, and it has lost more than $5 billion during the last three years. The Enterprise Mobility Solutions & Wireless Networks business manufactures, designs, and services public safety radios, handheld scanners and telecommunications network gear for businesses and government agencies and generates nearly all of the Motorola's current cash flow. This business also makes network equipment for wireless carriers such as Spring Nextel and Verizon Wireless. By dividing the company in this manner, Motorola would separate its loss-generating Mobility Devices division from its other businesses. Although the third largest handset manufacturer globally, the handset business had been losing market share to Nokia and Samsung Electronics for years. Following the breakup, the Mobility Devices unit would be renamed Motorola Mobility, and the Enterprise Mobility Solutions & Networks operation would be called Motorola Solutions. Motorola's board is seeking to ensure the financial viability of Motorola Mobility by eliminating its outstanding debt and through a cash infusion. To do so, Motorola intends to buy back nearly all of its outstanding $3.9 billion debt and to transfer as much as $4 billion in cash to Motorola Mobility. Furthermore, Motorola Solutions would assume responsibility for the pension obligations of Motorola Mobility. If Motorola Mobility were to be forced into bankruptcy shortly after the breakup, Motorola Solutions may be held legally responsible for some of the business's liabilities. The court would have to prove that Motorola had conveyed the Mobility Devices unit (renamed Motorola Mobility following the breakup) to its shareholders, fraudulently knowing that the unit's financial viability was problematic. Once free of debt and other obligations and flush with cash, Motorola Mobility would be in a better position to make acquisitions and to develop new phones. It would also be more attractive as a takeover target. A stand-alone firm is unencumbered by intercompany relationships, including such things as administrative support or parts and services supplied by other areas of Motorola. Moreover, all liabilities and assets associated with the handset business already would have been identified, making it easier for a potential partner to value the business. In mid-2010, Motorola Inc. announced that it had reached an agreement with Nokia Siemens Networks, a Finnish-German joint venture, to buy the wireless networks operations, formerly part of its Enterprise Mobility Solutions & Wireless Network Devices business for $1.2 billion. On January 4, 2011, Motorola Inc. spun off the common shares of Motorola Mobility it held as a tax-free dividend to its shareholders and renamed the firm Motorola Solutions. Each shareholder of record as of December 21, 2010, would receive one share of Motorola Mobility common for every eight shares of Motorola Inc. common stock they held. Table 15.3 shows the timeline of Motorola's restructuring effort. 1.In your judgment, did the breakup of Motorola make sense? Explain your answer. 2.What other restructuring alternatives could Motorola have pursued to increase shareholder value? Why do you believe it pursued this breakup strategy rather than some other option? -Kraft CEO Irene Rosenfeld argued that an important justification for the Cadbury acquisition in 2010 was to create two portfolios of businesses: some very strong cash generating businesses and some very strong growth businesses in order to increase shareholder value.How might this strategy have boosted the firm's value?

Which one of the following is generally not a reason for issuing tracking stocks?

Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions Motorola Bows to Activist Pressure Under pressure from activist investor Carl Icahn, Motorola felt compelled to make a dramatic move before its May 2008 shareholders' meeting. Icahn had submitted a slate of four directors to replace those up for reelection and demanded that the wireless handset and network manufacturer take actions to improve profitability. Shares of Motorola, which had a market value of $22 billion, had fallen more than 60% since October 2006, making the firm's board vulnerable in the proxy contest over director reelections. Signaling its willingness to take dramatic action, Motorola announced on March 26, 2008, its intention to create two independent, publicly traded companies. The two new companies would consist of the firm's former Mobile Devices operation (including its Home Devices businesses consisting of modems and set-top boxes) and its Enterprise Mobility Solutions & Wireless Networks business. In addition to the planned spin-off, Motorola agreed to nominate two people supported by Carl Icahn to the firm's board. Originally scheduled for 2009, the breakup was postponed due to the upheaval in the financial markets that year. The breakup would result in a tax-free distribution to Motorola's shareholders, with shareholders receiving shares of the two independent and publicly traded firms. The Mobile Devices business designs, manufactures, and sells mobile handsets globally, and it has lost more than $5 billion during the last three years. The Enterprise Mobility Solutions & Wireless Networks business manufactures, designs, and services public safety radios, handheld scanners and telecommunications network gear for businesses and government agencies and generates nearly all of the Motorola's current cash flow. This business also makes network equipment for wireless carriers such as Spring Nextel and Verizon Wireless. By dividing the company in this manner, Motorola would separate its loss-generating Mobility Devices division from its other businesses. Although the third largest handset manufacturer globally, the handset business had been losing market share to Nokia and Samsung Electronics for years. Following the breakup, the Mobility Devices unit would be renamed Motorola Mobility, and the Enterprise Mobility Solutions & Networks operation would be called Motorola Solutions. Motorola's board is seeking to ensure the financial viability of Motorola Mobility by eliminating its outstanding debt and through a cash infusion. To do so, Motorola intends to buy back nearly all of its outstanding $3.9 billion debt and to transfer as much as $4 billion in cash to Motorola Mobility. Furthermore, Motorola Solutions would assume responsibility for the pension obligations of Motorola Mobility. If Motorola Mobility were to be forced into bankruptcy shortly after the breakup, Motorola Solutions may be held legally responsible for some of the business's liabilities. The court would have to prove that Motorola had conveyed the Mobility Devices unit (renamed Motorola Mobility following the breakup) to its shareholders, fraudulently knowing that the unit's financial viability was problematic. Once free of debt and other obligations and flush with cash, Motorola Mobility would be in a better position to make acquisitions and to develop new phones. It would also be more attractive as a takeover target. A stand-alone firm is unencumbered by intercompany relationships, including such things as administrative support or parts and services supplied by other areas of Motorola. Moreover, all liabilities and assets associated with the handset business already would have been identified, making it easier for a potential partner to value the business. In mid-2010, Motorola Inc. announced that it had reached an agreement with Nokia Siemens Networks, a Finnish-German joint venture, to buy the wireless networks operations, formerly part of its Enterprise Mobility Solutions & Wireless Network Devices business for $1.2 billion. On January 4, 2011, Motorola Inc. spun off the common shares of Motorola Mobility it held as a tax-free dividend to its shareholders and renamed the firm Motorola Solutions. Each shareholder of record as of December 21, 2010, would receive one share of Motorola Mobility common for every eight shares of Motorola Inc. common stock they held. Table 15.3 shows the timeline of Motorola's restructuring effort. 1.In your judgment, did the breakup of Motorola make sense? Explain your answer. 2.What other restructuring alternatives could Motorola have pursued to increase shareholder value? Why do you believe it pursued this breakup strategy rather than some other option? -Why did Kraft chose not to divest its grocery business,using the proceeds to either reinvest in its faster growing snack business,to buy back its stock,or a combination of the two?

Managing highly diverse and complex portfolios of businesses is both time consuming and distracting.This is particularly true when the businesses are in largely related industries.

Gillette Announces Divestiture Plans With 1998 sales of $10.1 billion, Gillette is the world leader in the production of razor blades, razors, and shaving cream. Gillette also has a leading position in the production of pens and other writing instruments. Gillette's consolidated operating performance during 1999 depended on its core razor blade and razor, Duracell battery, and oral care businesses. Reflecting disappointment in the performance of certain operating units, Gillette's CEO, Michael Hawley, announced in October 1999 his intention to divest poorly performing businesses unless he could be convinced by early 2000 that they could be turned around. The businesses under consideration at that time comprised about 15% of the company's $10 billion in annual sales. Hawley saw the new focus of the company to be in razor blades, batteries, and oral care. To achieve this new focus, Hawley intended to prune the firm's product portfolio. The most likely targets for divestiture at the time included pens (i.e., PaperMate, Parker, and Waterman), with the prospects for operating performance for these units considered dismal. Other units under consideration for divestiture included Braun and toiletries. With respect to these businesses, Hawley apparently intended to be selective. At Braun, where overall operating profits plunged 43% in the first three quarters of 1999, Hawley has announced that Gillette will keep electric shavers and electric toothbrushes. However, the household and personal care appliance units are likely divestiture candidates. The timing of these sales may be poor. A decision to sell Braun at this time would compete against Black & Decker's recently announced decision to sell its appliance business. Although Gillette would be smaller, the firm believes that its margins will improve and that its earnings growth will be more rapid. Moreover, divesting such problem businesses as pens and appliances would let management focus on the units whose prospects are the brightest. These are businesses that Gillette's previous management was simply not willing to sell because of their perceived high potential. : -Describe the process Gillette's management may have gone through to determine which business units to sell and which to keep.

AT&T (1984 - 2005)-A POSTER CHILD FOR RESTRUCTURING GONE AWRY Between 1984 and 2000, AT&T underwent four major restructuring programs. These included the government-mandated breakup in 1984, the 1996 effort to eliminate customer conflicts, the 1998 plan to become a broadband powerhouse, and the most recent restructuring program announced in 2000 to correct past mistakes. It is difficult to identify another major corporation that has undergone as much sustained trauma as AT&T. Ironically, a former AT&T operating unit acquired its former parent in 2005. The 1984 Restructure: Changed the Organization But Not the Culture The genesis of Ma Bell's problems may have begun with the consent decree signed with the Department of Justice in 1984, which resulted in the spin-off of its local telephone operations to its shareholders. AT&T retained its long-distance and telecommunications equipment manufacturing operations. Although the breadth of the firm's product offering changed dramatically, little else seems to have changed. The firm remained highly bureaucratic, risk averse, and inward looking. However, substantial market share in the lucrative long-distance market continued to generate huge cash flow for the company, thereby enabling the company to be slow to react to the changing competitive dynamics of the marketplace. The 1996 Restructure: Lack of a Coherent Strategy Cash accumulated from the long-distance business was spent on a variety of ill-conceived strategies such as the firm's foray into the personal computer business. After years of unsuccessfully attempting to redefine the company's strategy, AT&T once again resorted to a major restructure of the firm. In 1996, AT&T spun-off Lucent Technologies (its telecommunications equipment business) and NCR (a computer services business) to shareholders to facilitate Lucent equipment sales to former AT&T operations and to eliminate the non-core NCR computer business. However, this had little impact on the AT&T share price. The 1998 Restructure: Vision Exceeds Ability to Execute In its third major restructure since 1984, AT&T CEO Michael Armstrong passionately unveiled in June of 1998 a daring strategy to transform AT&T from a struggling long-distance telephone company into a broadband internet access and local phone services company. To accomplish this end, he outlined his intentions to acquire cable companies MediaOne Group and Telecommunications Inc. for $58 billion and $48 billion, respectively. The plan was to use cable-TV networks to deliver the first fully integrated package of broadband internet access and local phone service via the cable-TV network. AT&T Could Not Handle Its Early Success During the next several years, Armstrong seemed to be up to the task, cutting sales, general, and administrative expense's share of revenue from 28 percent to 20 percent, giving AT&T a cost structure comparable to its competitors. He attempted to change the bureaucratic culture to one able to compete effectively in the deregulated environment of the post-1996 Telecommunications Act by issuing stock options to all employees, tying compensation to performance, and reducing layers of managers. He used AT&T's stock, as well as cash, to buy the cable companies before the decline in AT&T's long-distance business pushed the stock into a free fall. He also transformed AT&T Wireless from a collection of local businesses into a national business. Notwithstanding these achievements, AT&T experienced major missteps. Employee turnover became a big problem, especially among senior managers. Armstrong also bought Telecommunications and MediaOne when valuations for cable-television assets were near their peak. He paid about $106 billion in 2000, when they were worth about $80 billion. His failure to cut enough deals with other cable operators (e.g., Time Warner) to sell AT&T's local phone service meant that AT&T could market its services only in regional markets rather than on a national basis. In addition, AT&T moved large corporate customers to its Concert joint venture with British Telecom, alienating many AT&T salespeople, who subsequently quit. As a result, customer service deteriorated rapidly and major customers defected. Finally, Armstrong seriously underestimated the pace of erosion in AT&T's long-distance revenue base. AT&T May Have Become Overwhelmed by the Rate of Change What happened? Perhaps AT&T fell victim to the same problems many other acquisitive companies have. AT&T is a company capable of exceptional vision but incapable of effective execution. Effective execution involves buying or building assets at a reasonable cost. Its substantial overpayment for its cable acquisitions meant that it would be unable to earn the returns required by investors in what they would consider a reasonable period. Moreover, Armstrong's efforts to shift from the firm's historical business by buying into the cable-TV business through acquisition had saddled the firm with $62 billion in debt. AT&T tried to do too much too quickly. New initiatives such as high-speed internet access and local telephone services over cable-television network were too small to pick up the slack. Much time and energy seems to have gone into planning and acquiring what were viewed as key building blocks to the strategy. However, there appears to have been insufficient focus and realism in terms of the time and resources required to make all the pieces of the strategy fit together. Some parts of the overall strategy were at odds with other parts. For example, AT&T undercut its core long-distance wired telephone business by offers of free long-distance wireless to attract new subscribers. Despite aggressive efforts to change the culture, AT&T continued to suffer from a culture that evolved in the years before 1996 during which the industry was heavily regulated. That atmosphere bred a culture based on consensus building, ponderously slow decision-making, and a low tolerance for risk. Consequently, the AT&T culture was unprepared for the fiercely competitive deregulated environment of the late 1990s (Truitt, 2001). Furthermore, AT&T created individual tracking stocks for AT&T Wireless and for Liberty Media. The intention of the tracking stocks was to link the unit's stock to its individual performance, create a currency for the unit to make acquisitions, and to provide a new means of motivating the unit's management by giving them stock in their own operation. Unlike a spin-off, AT&T's board continued to exert direct control over these units. In an IPO in April 2000, AT&T sold 14 percent of AT&T's Wireless tracking stock to the public to raise funds and to focus investor attention on the true value of the Wireless operations. Investors Lose Patience Although all of these actions created a sense that grandiose change was imminent, investor patience was wearing thin. Profitability foundered. The market share loss in its long-distance business accelerated. Although cash flow remained strong, it was clear that a cash machine so dependent on the deteriorating long-distance telephone business soon could grind to a halt. Investors' loss of faith was manifested in the sharp decline in AT&T stock that occurred in 2000. The 2000 Restructure: Correcting the Mistakes of the Past Pushed by investor impatience and a growing realization that achieving AT&T's vision would be more time and resource consuming than originally believed, Armstrong announced on October 25, 2000 the breakup of the business for the fourth time. The plan involved the creation of four new independent companies including AT&T Wireless, AT&T Consumer, AT&T Broadband, and Liberty Media. By breaking the company into specific segments, AT&T believed that individual units could operate more efficiently and aggressively. AT&T's consumer long-distance business would be able to enter the digital subscriber line (DSL) market. DSL is a broadband technology based on the telephone wires that connect individual homes with the telephone network. AT&T's cable operations could continue to sell their own fast internet connections and compete directly against AT&T's long-distance telephone business. Moreover, the four individual businesses would create "pure-play" investor opportunities. Specifically, AT&T proposed splitting off in early 2001 AT&T Wireless and issuing tracking stocks to the public in late 2001 for AT&T's Consumer operations, including long-distance and Worldnet Internet service, and AT&T's Broadband (cable) operations. The tracking shares would later be converted to regular AT&T common shares as if issued by AT&T Broadband, making it an independent entity. AT&T would retain AT&T Business Services (i.e., AT&T Lab and Telecommunications Network) with the surviving AT&T entity. Investor reaction was swift and negative. Not swayed by the proposal, investors caused the stock to drop 13 percent in a single day. Moreover, it ended 2000 at 17 ½, down 66 percent from the beginning of the year. The More Things Change The More They Stay The Same On July 10, 2001, AT&T Wireless Services became an independent company, in accordance with plans announced during the 2000 restructure program. AT&T Wireless became a separate company when AT&T converted the tracking shares of the mobile-phone business into common stock and split-off the unit from the parent. AT&T encouraged shareholders to exchange their AT&T common shares for Wireless common shares by offering AT&T shareholders 1.176 Wireless shares for each share of AT&T common. The exchange ratio represented a 6.5 percent premium over AT&T's current common share price. AT&T Wireless shares have fallen 44 percent since AT&T first sold the tracking stock in April 2000. On August 10, 2001, AT&T spun off Liberty Media. After extended discussions, AT&T agreed on December 21, 2001 to merge its broadband unit with Comcast to create the largest cable television and high-speed internet service company in the United States. Without the future growth engine offered by Broadband and Wireless, AT&T's remaining long-distance businesses and business services operations had limited growth prospects. After a decade of tumultuous change, AT&T was back where it was at the beginning of the 1990s. At about $15 billion in late 2004, AT&T's market capitalization was about one-sixth of that of such major competitors as Verizon and SBC. SBC Communications (a former local AT&T operating company) acquired AT&T on November 18, 2005 in a $16 billion deal and promptly renamed the combined firms AT&T. -Why do you believe that AT&T chose to split-off its wireless operations rather than to divest the unit? What might you have done differently?

Voluntary bust-ups or liquidations by the parent firm reflect management's judgment that the sale of individual parts of the firm could realize greater value than the value created by a continuation of the combined corporation.

In an equity carve-out,minority shareholders are eliminated.

Tracking stocks may create internal operating conflicts among the parent's business units in terms of how the consolidated firm's cash is allocated among its business units.

The timing of a divestiture is important.If the business to be sold is highly cyclical,the sale should be timed to coincide with the firm's peak year earnings.

When a parent creates a tracking stock for a subsidiary,it is giving up all control of that subsidiary.

Acquiring companies often find themselves with certain assets and operations of the acquired company that do not fit their primary strategy.Such assets may be divested to fund future investments.True of False

An equity carve-out is often a prelude to a complete divestiture of a business by the parent.

Viacom to Spin Off Blockbuster After months of trying to sell its 81% stake in Blockbuster Inc. undertook a tax-free spin-off in mid 2004. Viacom shareholders will have the option to swap their Viacom shares for Blockbuster shares and a special cash payout. Blockbuster had been hurt by competition from low-priced rivals and the erosion of video rentals by accelerating DVD sales. Despite Blockbuster's steady contribution to Viacom's overall cash flow, Viacom believed that the growth prospects for the unit were severely limited. In preparation for the spin-off, Viacom had reported a $1.3 billion charge to earnings in the fourth quarter of 2003 in writing down goodwill associated with its acquisition of Blockbuster. By spinning off Blockbuster, Viacom Chairman and ECO Sumner Redstone statd that the firm would now be able to focus on its core TV (i.e., CBS and MTV) and movie (i.e., Paramount Studios) businesses. Blockbuster shares fell by 4% and Viacom shares rose by 1% on the day of the announcement. : -Why would Viacom choose to spin-off rather than divest its Blockbuster unit? Explain your answer.

Hughes Corporation's Dramatic Transformation In one of the most dramatic redirections of corporate strategy in U.S. history, Hughes Corporation transformed itself from a defense industry behemoth into the world's largest digital information and communications company. Once California's largest manufacturing employer, Hughes Corporation built spacecraft, the world's first working laser, communications satellites, radar systems, and military weapons systems. However, by the late 1990s, the firm had undergone substantial gut-wrenching change to reposition the firm in what was viewed as a more attractive growth opportunity. This transformation culminated in the firm being acquired in 2004 by News Corp., a global media empire. To accomplish this transformation, Hughes divested its communications satellite businesses and its auto electronics operation. The corporate overhaul created a firm focused on direct-to-home satellite broadcasting with its DirecTV service offering. DirecTV's introduction to nearly 12 million U.S. homes was a technology made possible by U.S. military spending during the early 1980s. Although military spending had fueled much of Hughes' growth during the decade of the 1980s, it was becoming increasingly clear by 1988 that the level of defense spending of the Reagan years was coming to a close with the winding down of the cold war. For the next several years, Hughes attempted to find profitable niches in the rapidly consolidating U.S. defense contracting industry. Hughes acquired General Dynamics' missile business and made 15 smaller defense-related acquisitions. Eventually, Hughes' parent firm, General Motors, lost enthusiasm for additional investment in defense-related businesses. GM decided that, if Hughes could not participate in the shrinking defense industry, there was no reason to retain any interests in the industry at all. In November 1995, Hughes initiated discussions with Raytheon, and two years later, it sold its aerospace and defense business to Raytheon for $9.8 billion. The firm also merged its Delco product line with GM's Delphi automotive systems. What remained was the firm's telecommunications division. Hughes had transformed itself from a $16 billion defense contractor to a svelte $4 billion telecommunications business. Hughes' telecommunications unit was its smallest operation but, with DirecTV, its fastest growing. The transformation was to exact a huge cultural toll on Hughes' employees, most of whom had spent their careers dealing with the U.S. Department of Defense. Hughes moved to hire people aggressively from the cable and broadcast businesses. By the late 1990s, former Hughes' employees constituted only 15-20 percent of DirecTV's total employees. Restructuring continued through the end of the 1990s. In 2000, Hughes sold its satellite manufacturing operations to Boeing for $3.75 billion. This eliminated the last component of the old Hughes and cut its workforce in half. In December 2000, Hughes paid about $180 million for Telocity, a firm that provides digital subscriber line service through phone lines. This acquisition allowed Hughes to provide high-speed Internet connections through its existing satellite service, mainly in more remote rural areas, as well as phone lines targeted at city dwellers. Hughes now could market the same combination of high-speed Internet services and video offered by cable providers, Hughes' primary competitor. In need of cash, GM put Hughes up for sale in late 2000, expressing confidence that there would be a flood of lucrative offers. However, the faltering economy and stock market resulted in GM receiving only one serious bid, from media tycoon Rupert Murdoch of News Corp. in February 2001. But, internal discord within Hughes and GM over the possible buyer of Hughes Electronics caused GM to backpedal and seek alternative bidders. In late October 2001, GM agreed to sell its Hughes Electronics subsidiary and its DirecTV home satellite network to EchoStar Communication for $25.8 billion. However, regulators concerned about the antitrust implications of the deal disallowed this transaction. In early 2004, News Corp., General Motors, and Hughes reached a definitive agreement in which News Corp acquired GM's 19.9 percent stake in Hughes and an additional 14.1 percent of Hughes from public shareholders and GM's pension and other benefit plans. News Corp. paid about $14 per share, making the deal worth about $6.6 billion for 34.1 percent of Hughes. The implied value of 100 percent of Hughes was, at that time, $19.4 billion, about three fourths of EchoStar's valuation three years earlier. Case Study : -How did changes in Hughes' external environment contribute to its dramatic 20-year restructuring effort? Cite specific influences in answering this question.(Hint: Consider some of the motivations discussed in this chapter for engaging in restructuring activities.).Cite examples of how Hughes took advantage of their core competencies in pursuing other alternatives?