Exam 27: Game Theory-Part B

A small community has 20 people, each of whom has a wealth of $12,000.Each individual must choose whether to contribute $300 or $0 to the support of public entertainment for their community.The money value of the benefit that a person gets from this public entertainment is b times the total amount of money contributed by individuals in the community.

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(Multiple Choice)

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Question 1

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Two partners start a business.Each has two possible strategies, spend full time or secretly take a second job and spend only part time on the business.Any profits that the business makes will be split equally between the two partners, regardless of whether they work full time or part time for the business.If a partner takes a second job, he will earn $50,000 from this job plus his share of profits from the business.If he spends full time on the business, his only source of income is his share of profits from this business.If both partners spend full time on the business, total profits will be $200,000.If one partner spends full time on the business and the other takes a second job, the business profits will be $80,000.If both partners take second job, the total business profits are $20,000.

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(Multiple Choice)

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Question 2

Correct Answer:

Verified

A small community has 10 people, each of whom has a wealth of $19,000.Each individual must choose whether to contribute $200 or $0 to the support of public entertainment for their community.The money value of the benefit that a person gets from this public entertainment is .80 times the total amount of money contributed by individuals in the community.

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(Multiple Choice)

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Question 3

Correct Answer:

Verified

If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X, then the number of people who will attend next week is 48 + 0.40X.What is a long-run equilibrium attendance for this club?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 4

Two partners start a business.Each has two possible strategies, spend full time or secretly take a second job and spend only part time on the business.Any profits that the business makes will be split equally between the two partners, regardless of whether they work full time or part time for the business.If a partner takes a second job, he will earn $10,000 from this job plus his share of profits from the business.If he spends full time on the business, his only source of income is his share of profits from this business.If both partners spend full time on the business, total profits will be $200,000.If one partner spends full time on the business and the other takes a second job, the business profits will be $80,000.If both partners take second job, the total business profits are $20,000.

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 5

A small community has 10 people, each of whom has a wealth of $17,000.Each individual must choose whether to contribute $200 or $0 to the support of public entertainment for their community.The money value of the benefit that a person gets from this public entertainment is .80 times the total amount of money contributed by individuals in the community.

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 6

Alice and Betsy are playing a game in which each can play either of two strategies, leave or stay.If both play the strategy leave, then each gets a payoff of $100.If both play the strategy stay, then each gets a payoff of $400.If one plays stay and the other plays leave, then the one who plays stay gets a payoff of $C and the one who plays leave gets a payoff of $D.When is the outcome where both play leave a Nash equilibrium?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 7

If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X, then the number of people who will attend next week is 80 + 0.20X.What is a long-run equilibrium attendance for this club?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 8

A small community has 40 people, each of whom has a wealth of $5,000.Each individual must choose whether to contribute $200 or $0 to the support of public entertainment for their community.The money value of the benefit that a person gets from this public entertainment is b times the total amount of money contributed by individuals in the community.

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 9

A small community has 10 people, each of whom has a wealth of $3,000.Each individual must choose whether to contribute $300 or $0 to the support of public entertainment for their community.The money value of the benefit that a person gets from this public entertainment is .50 times the total amount of money contributed by individuals in the community.

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 10

Alice and Betsy are playing a game in which each can play either of two strategies, leave or stay.If both play the strategy leave, then each gets a payoff of $400.If both play the strategy stay, then each gets a payoff of $800.If one plays stay and the other plays leave, then the one who plays stay gets a payoff of $C and the one who plays leave gets a payoff of $D.When is the outcome where both play leave a Nash equilibrium?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 11

A small community has 10 people, each of whom has a wealth of $5,000.Each individual must choose whether to contribute $300 or $0 to the support of public entertainment for their community.The money value of the benefit that a person gets from this public entertainment is b times the total amount of money contributed by individuals in the community.

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 12

If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X, then the number of people who will attend next week is 56 + 0.60X.What is a long-run equilibrium attendance for this club?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 13

If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X, then the number of people who will attend next week is 30 + 0.70X.What is a long-run equilibrium attendance for this club?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 14

Two partners start a business.Each has two possible strategies, spend full time or secretly take a second job and spend only part time on the business.Any profits that the business makes will be split equally between the two partners, regardless of whether they work full time or part time for the business.If a partner takes a second job, he will earn $20,000 from this job plus his share of profits from the business.If he spends full time on the business, his only source of income is his share of profits from this business.If both partners spend full time on the business, total profits will be $200,000.If one partner spends full time on the business and the other takes a second job, the business profits will be $80,000.If both partners take second job, the total business profits are $20,000.

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 15

Two partners start a business.Each has two possible strategies, spend full time or secretly take a second job and spend only part time on the business.Any profits that the business makes will be split equally between the two partners, regardless of whether they work full time or part time for the business.If a partner takes a second job, he will earn $60,000 from this job plus his share of profits from the business.If he spends full time on the business, his only source of income is his share of profits from this business.If both partners spend full time on the business, total profits will be $200,000.If one partner spends full time on the business and the other takes a second job, the business profits will be $80,000.If both partners take second job, the total business profits are $20,000.

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 16

Alice and Betsy are playing a game in which each can play either of two strategies, leave or stay.If both play the strategy leave, then each gets a payoff of $100.If both play the strategy stay, then each gets a payoff of $800.If one plays stay and the other plays leave, then the one who plays stay gets a payoff of $C and the one who plays leave gets a payoff of $D.When is the outcome where both play leave a Nash equilibrium?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 17

Alice and Betsy are playing a game in which each can play either of two strategies, leave or stay.If both play the strategy leave, then each gets a payoff of $300.If both play the strategy stay, then each gets a payoff of $600.If one plays stay and the other plays leave, then the one who plays stay gets a payoff of $C and the one who plays leave gets a payoff of $D.When is the outcome where both play leave a Nash equilibrium?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 18

A small community has 40 people, each of whom has a wealth of $16,000.Each individual must choose whether to contribute $100 or $0 to the support of public entertainment for their community.The money value of the benefit that a person gets from this public entertainment is b times the total amount of money contributed by individuals in the community.

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 19

Alice and Betsy are playing a game in which each can play either of two strategies, leave or stay.If both play the strategy leave, then each gets a payoff of $200.If both play the strategy stay, then each gets a payoff of $800.If one plays stay and the other plays leave, then the one who plays stay gets a payoff of $C and the one who plays leave gets a payoff of $D.When is the outcome where both play leave a Nash equilibrium?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 20

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Exam 27: Game Theory-Part B

If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X, then the number of people who will attend next week is 48 + 0.40X.What is a long-run equilibrium attendance for this club?

If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X, then the number of people who will attend next week is 80 + 0.20X.What is a long-run equilibrium attendance for this club?

If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X, then the number of people who will attend next week is 56 + 0.60X.What is a long-run equilibrium attendance for this club?

If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X, then the number of people who will attend next week is 30 + 0.70X.What is a long-run equilibrium attendance for this club?

Budget Constraint-Part A

Budget Constraint-Part B

Preferences-Part A

Preferences-Part B

Utility-Part A

Utility-Part B

Choice-Part A

Choice-Part B

Demand-Part A

Demand-Part B

Revealed Preference-Part A

Revealed Preference-Part B

Slutsky Equation-Part A

Slutsky Equation-Part B

Buying and Selling-Part A

Buying and Selling-Part B

Intertemporal Choice-Part A

Intertemporal Choice-Part B

Asset Markets-Part A

Asset Markets-Part B

Uncertainty-Part A

Uncertainty-Part B

Risky Assets-Part A

Risky Assets-Part B

Consumers Surplus-Part A

Consumers Surplus-Part B

Market Demand-Part A

Market Demand-Part B

Equilibrium-Part A

Equilibrium-Part B

Auctions-Part A

Auctions-Part B

Technology-Part A

Technology-Part B

Profit Maximization-Part A

Profit Maximization-Part B

Cost Minimization-Part A

Cost Minimization-Part B

Cost Curves-Part A

Cost Curves-Part B

Firm Supply-Part A

Firm Supply-Part B

Industry Supply-Part A

Industry Supply-Part B

Monopoly-Part A

Monopoly-Part B

Monopoly Behavior-Part A

Monopoly Behavior-Part B

Factor Markets-Part A

Factor Markets-Part B

Oligopoly-Part A

Oligopoly-Part B

Game Theory-Part A

Game Applications-Part A

Game Applications-Part B

Behavioral Economics

Exchange-Part A

Exchange-Part B

Production-Part A

Production-Part B

Welfare-Part A

Welfare-Part B

Externalities-Part A

Externalities-Part B

Information Technology-Part A

Information Technology-Part B

Public Goods-Part A

Public Goods-Part B

Asymmetric Information-Part A

Asymmetric Information-Part B

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