Exam 6: Strategy and Game Theory

For an infinitely repeated game promising A per period with continuing cooperation,B for the one period gain from cheating and C per period for the non-cooperative solution (B > A > C)will have a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in trigger strategies providing

What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the following game?

Which statement is true of the Battle of the Sexes game?

The strategy profile in which both players remain silent in the Prisoners' Dilemma can be described as

In the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the following game in which players randomize between B and C and do not play A at all,what is the probability that each plays B?

In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium,a player is willing to randomize because

Consider a version of the Tragedy of the Commons in which herder 1 and 2 simultaneously choose to graze quantities of sheep $q _ { 1 }$ and $q 2$ ,respectively,and in which the payoff functions are $q _ { 1 } \left( 100 - q _ { 1 } - q _ { 2 } \right)$ for 1 and $q _ { 2 } \left( 100 - q _ { 1 } - q _ { 2 } \right)$ for 2.The Nash equilibrium is $q _ { 1 } ^ { * } = q _ { 2 } ^ { * } =$

Which of the following is a true statement about signaling games?

A subgame-perfect equilibrium

A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies that are mutual

Cheap talk

A game of incomplete information is distinct from one of complete information in that players

The difference between a Nash equilibrium strategy and a dominant strategy is

Consider a version of the Tragedy of the Commons in which herder 1 and 2 simultaneously choose to graze quantities of sheep $q _ { 1 }$ and $q 2$ ,respectively.If herder 1's payoff function is $q _ { 1 } \left( 100 - q _ { 1 } - q _ { 2 } \right)$ ,his or her best response function is

Nash equilibria

In experimental tests of the ultimatum game,

The general message of the folk theorems is that

The difference between a Nash equilibrium and a subgame-perfect equilibrium is