Exam 38:Asymmetric Information-Part B
Exam 6:Demand-Part A36 Questions
Exam 7:Revealed Preference-Part A53 Questions
Exam 7:Revealed Preference-Part B15 Questions
Exam 8:Slutsky Equation-Part A51 Questions
Exam 8:Slutsky Equation-Part B30 Questions
Exam 9:Buying and Selling-Part A75 Questions
Exam 9:Buying and Selling-Part B30 Questions
Exam 10:Intertemporal Choice-Part A61 Questions
Exam 10:Intertemporal Choice-Part B31 Questions
Exam 11:Asset Markets-Part A46 Questions
Exam 11:Asset Markets-Part B29 Questions
Exam 12:Uncertainty-Part A39 Questions
Exam 12:Uncertainty-Part B24 Questions
Exam 13:Risky Assets-Part A12 Questions
Exam 13:Risky Assets-Part B5 Questions
Exam 14:Consumers Surplus-Part A41 Questions
Exam 14:Consumers Surplus-Part B30 Questions
Exam 15:Market Demand-Part A98 Questions
Exam 15:Market Demand-Part B25 Questions
Exam 16:Equilibrium-Part A45 Questions
Exam 16:Equilibrium-Part B15 Questions
Exam 18:Auctions-Part A36 Questions
Exam 18:Auctions-Part B25 Questions
Exam 19:Technology-Part A48 Questions
Exam 19:Technology-Part B25 Questions
Exam 20:Profit Maximization-Part A49 Questions
Exam 20:Profit Maximization-Part B21 Questions
Exam 21:Cost Minimization-Part A78 Questions
Exam 21:Cost Minimization-Part B26 Questions
Exam 22:Cost Curves-Part A49 Questions
Exam 22:Cost Curves-Part B25 Questions
Exam 23:Firm Supply-Part A46 Questions
Exam 23:Firm Supply-Part B15 Questions
Exam 24: Industry Supply-Part A38 Questions
Exam 24: Industry Supply-Part B33 Questions
Exam 25:Monopoly-Part A71 Questions
Exam 25:Monopoly-Part B25 Questions
Exam 26:Monopoly Behavior-Part A33 Questions
Exam 26:Monopoly Behavior-Part B20 Questions
Exam 27:Factor Markets-Part A23 Questions
Exam 27:Factor Markets-Part B20 Questions
Exam 28:Oligopoly-Part A55 Questions
Exam 28:Oligopoly-Part B25 Questions
Exam 29:Game Theory-Part A33 Questions
Exam 29:Game Theory-Part B25 Questions
Exam 30:Game Applications-Part A28 Questions
Exam 30:Game Applications-Part B25 Questions
Exam 31:Behavioral Economics-Part A31 Questions
Exam 32:Exchange-Part A72 Questions
Exam 32:Exchange-Part B30 Questions
Exam 33:Production-Part A34 Questions
Exam 33:Production-Part B25 Questions
Exam 34:Welfare-Part A25 Questions
Exam 34:Welfare-Part B25 Questions
Exam 35:Externalities-Part A42 Questions
Exam 35:Externalities-Part B20 Questions
Exam 36:Information Technology-Part A24 Questions
Exam 36:Information Technology-Part B15 Questions
Exam 37:Public Goods-Part A21 Questions
Exam 37:Public Goods-Part B15 Questions
Exam 38:Asymmetric Information-Part A29 Questions
Exam 38:Asymmetric Information-Part B20 Questions
Select questions type
Suppose that in New Crankshaft,Pennsylvania,the quality distribution of the 2,000 used cars on the market is such that the number of used cars of value less than V is V/2.Original owners must sell their used cars.Original owners know what their cars are worth,but buyers can't determine a car's value until they buy it.An owner can either take his car to an appraiser and pay the appraiser $500 to appraise the car (accurately and credibly)or sell the car unappraised.In equilibrium,car owners will have their cars appraised if and only if their value is at least
Free
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(42)
Correct Answer:
D
In Rustbucket,Michigan,there are 200 used cars for sale,half of them are good and half of them are lemons.Owners of lemons are willing to sell them for $200.Owners of good used cars are willing to sell them for prices above $1,100 but will keep them if the price is lower than $1,100.There is a large number of potential buyers who are willing to pay $500 for a lemon and $1,500 for a good car.Buyers can't tell good cars from bad,but original owners know.
Free
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(44)
Correct Answer:
D
In Rustbucket,Michigan,there are 200 used cars for sale,half of them are good and half of them are lemons.Owners of lemons are willing to sell them for $500.Owners of good used cars are willing to sell them for prices above $900 but will keep them if the price is lower than $900.There is a large number of potential buyers who are willing to pay $700 for a lemon and $1,900 for a good car.Buyers can't tell good cars from bad,but original owners know.
Free
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(33)
Correct Answer:
A
Suppose that in Enigma,Ohio,klutzes have a productivity of $1,000 and kandos have a productivity of $5,000 per month.You can't tell klutzes from kandos by looking at them or asking them,and it is too expensive to monitor individual productivity.Kandos,however,have more patience than klutzes.Listening to an hour of dull lectures is as bad as losing $300 for a klutz and $150 for a kando.There will be a separating equilibrium in which anybody who attends a course of H hours of lectures is paid $5,000 per month and anybody who does not is paid $1,000 per month
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(30)
Suppose that low-productivity workers all have marginal products of 10 and high-productivity workers all have marginal products of 16.The community has equal numbers of each type of worker.The local community college offers a course in microeconomics.High-productivity workers think taking this course is as bad as a wage cut of $2,and low-productivity workers think it is as bad as a wage cut of $4.
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(40)
Suppose that low-productivity workers all have marginal products of 10 and high-productivity workers all have marginal products of 16.The community has equal numbers of each type of worker.The local community college offers a course in microeconomics.High-productivity workers think taking this course is as bad as a wage cut of $2,and low-productivity workers think it is as bad as a wage cut of $6.
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(40)
In Rustbucket,Michigan,there are 200 used cars for sale,half of them are good and half of them are lemons.Owners of lemons are willing to sell them for $100.Owners of good used cars are willing to sell them for prices above $1,100 but will keep them if the price is lower than $1,100.There is a large number of potential buyers who are willing to pay $200 for a lemon and $2,100 for a good car.Buyers can't tell good cars from bad,but original owners know.
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(44)
Suppose that in Enigma,Ohio,klutzes have a productivity of $1,000 and kandos have a productivity of $5,000 per month.You can't tell klutzes from kandos by looking at them or asking them,and it is too expensive to monitor individual productivity.Kandos,however,have more patience than klutzes.Listening to an hour of dull lectures is as bad as losing $150 for a klutz and $50 for a kando.There will be a separating equilibrium in which anybody who attends a course of H hours of lectures is paid $5,000 per month and anybody who does not is paid $1,000 per month
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(32)
Suppose that in Enigma,Ohio,klutzes have a productivity of $1,000 and kandos have a productivity of $4,000 per month.You can't tell klutzes from kandos by looking at them or asking them,and it is too expensive to monitor individual productivity.Kandos,however,have more patience than klutzes.Listening to an hour of dull lectures is as bad as losing $150 for a klutz and $50 for a kando.There will be a separating equilibrium in which anybody who attends a course of H hours of lectures is paid $4,000 per month and anybody who does not is paid $1,000 per month
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(35)
In Rustbucket,Michigan,there are 200 used cars for sale,half of them are good and half of them are lemons.Owners of lemons are willing pay $200 for a lemon and $2,300 for a good car.Buyers can't tell good cars from bad,but original owners know.
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(42)
Suppose that in New Crankshaft,Pennsylvania,the quality distribution of the 5,000 used cars on the market is such that the number of used cars of value less than V is V/2.Original owners must sell their used cars.Original owners know what their cars are worth,but buyers can't determine a car's value until they buy it.An owner can either take his car to an appraiser and pay the appraiser $200 to appraise the car (accurately and credibly)or sell the car unappraised.In equilibrium,car owners will have their cars appraised if and only if their value is at least
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(38)
In Rustbucket,Michigan,there are 200 used cars for sale,half of them are good and half of them are lemons.Owners of lemons are willing to sell them for $300.Owners of good used cars are willing to sell them for prices above $1,300 but will keep them if the price is lower than $1,300.There is a large number of potential buyers who are willing to pay $600 for a lemon and $2,100 for a good car.Buyers can't tell good cars from bad,but original owners know.
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(38)
Suppose that low-productivity workers all have marginal products of 10 and high-productivity workers all have marginal products of 16.The community has equal numbers of each type of worker.The local community college offers a course in microeconomics.High-productivity workers think taking this course is as bad as a wage cut of $3,and low-productivity workers think it is as bad as a wage cut of $5.
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(28)
Suppose that in Enigma,Ohio,klutzes have a productivity of $1,000 and kandos have a productivity of $4,000 per month.You can't tell klutzes from kandos by looking at them or asking them,and it is too expensive to monitor individual productivity.Kandos,however,have more patience than klutzes.Listening to an hour of dull lectures is as bad losing $200 for a klutz and $150 for a kando.There will be a separating equilibrium in which anybody who attends a course of H hours of lectures is paid $4,000 per month and anybody who does not is paid $1,000 per month
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(34)
Suppose that in Enigma,Ohio,klutzes have a productivity of $1,000 and kandos have a productivity of $4,000 per month.You can't tell klutzes from kandos by looking at them or asking them,and it is too expensive to monitor individual productivity.Kandos,however,have more patience than klutzes.Listening to an hour of dull lectures is as bad as losing $300 for a klutz and $150 for a kando.There will be a separating equilibrium in which anybody who attends a course of H hours of lectures is paid $4,000 per month and anybody who does not is paid $1,000 per month
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(42)
Suppose that in New Crankshaft,Pennsylvania,the quality distribution of the 3,000 used cars on the market is such that the number of used cars of value less than V is V/2.Original owners must sell their used cars.Original owners know what their cars are worth,but buyers can't determine a car's value until they buy it.An owner can either take his car to an appraiser and pay the appraiser $100 to appraise the car (accurately and credibly)or sell the car unappraised.In equilibrium,car owners will have their cars appraised if and only if their value is at least
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(38)
Suppose that in New Crankshaft,Pennsylvania,the quality distribution of the 8,000 used cars on the market is such that the number of used cars of value less than V is V/2.Original owners must sell their used cars.Original owners know what their cars are worth,but buyers can't determine a car's value until they buy it.An owner can either take his car to an appraiser and pay the appraiser $300 to appraise the car (accurately and credibly)or sell the car unappraised.In equilibrium,car owners will have their cars appraised if and only if their value is at least
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(40)
Suppose that low-productivity workers all have marginal products of 10 and high-productivity workers all have marginal products of 15.The community has equal numbers of each type of worker.The local community college offers a course in microeconomics.High-productivity workers think taking this course is as bad as a wage cut of $2,and low-productivity workers think it is as bad as a wage cut of $4.
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(38)
Suppose that in New Crankshaft,Pennsylvania,the quality distribution of the 4,000 used cars on the market is such that the number of used cars of value less than V is V/2.Original owners must sell their used cars.Original owners know what their cars are worth,but buyers can't determine a car's value until they buy it.An owner can either take his car to an appraiser and pay the appraiser $400 to appraise the car (accurately and credibly)or sell the car unappraised.In equilibrium,car owners will have their cars appraised if and only if their value is at least
(Multiple Choice)
5.0/5
(44)
Suppose that low-productivity workers all have marginal products of 10 and high-productivity workers all have marginal products of 12.The community has equal numbers of each type of worker.The local community college offers a course in microeconomics.High-productivity workers think taking this course is as bad as a wage cut of $5,and low-productivity workers think it is as bad as a wage cut of $9.
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(30)
Filters
- Essay(0)
- Multiple Choice(0)
- Short Answer(0)
- True False(0)
- Matching(0)