Exam 15: Introduction to Game Theory
Exam 1: Microeconomics: a Working Methodology98 Questions
Exam 2: A Theory of Preferences103 Questions
Exam 3: Demand Theory93 Questions
Exam 4: More Demand Theory94 Questions
Exam 5: Intertemporal Decision Making and Capital Values94 Questions
Exam 6: Production Cost: One Variable Input94 Questions
Exam 7: Production Cost: Many Variable Inputs96 Questions
Exam 8: The Theory of Perfect Competition102 Questions
Exam 9: Applications of the Competitive Model96 Questions
Exam 10: Monopoly99 Questions
Exam 11: Input Markets and the Allocation of Resources98 Questions
Exam 12: Labour Market Applications80 Questions
Exam 13: Competitive General Equilibrium95 Questions
Exam 14: Price Discrimination Monopoly Practices94 Questions
Exam 15: Introduction to Game Theory83 Questions
Exam 16: Game Theory and Oligopoly90 Questions
Exam 17: Choice Making Under Uncertainty86 Questions
Exam 18: Assymmetric Information, the Rules of the Game, and Externalities98 Questions
Exam 19: The Theory of the Firm96 Questions
Exam 20: Assymetric Information and Market Behaviour101 Questions
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The following mathematical properties should characterize the payoff functions:
(Multiple Choice)
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Present a real life example that can be understood better if modeled as a prisoner's dilemma.
(Essay)
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In which of the following would we expect that there is no dominant strategy?
(Multiple Choice)
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Firms Alba Inc. and Bute Inc. are duopolists selling firecrackers. Each of them has the option to charge high prices or low prices. Alba was longer in the business and its cost structure allows for higher profits. Also, Alba enjoys a strong reputation among customers and is able to charge higher prices. For the strategy combination (high, high)the payoff is (200,120), where the first position refers to Alba, and the second to Bute. Similarly, for (high, low)the payoff is (100,150), for (low, high)the payoff is (50, 0), while for (low, low)is (50, 25).
a)What is the dominant strategy for each firm?
b)Find the Nash equilibrium.
c)Can Alba induce Bute to charge a high price by threatening to charge a low price otherwise?
(Essay)
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Consider the classic prisoner's dilemma problem where both players get a payoff of - 1 if they're silent, both get a payoff of - 6 if they fink, and if only one finks that person receives the payoff of zero and the one that remains silent gets a payoff of - 9. When the two prisoners are kept separated the Nash equilibrium is for both to think. Does the Nash equilibrium change if the prisoners are permitted to discuss their choice in advance but are still required to plead separately?
(Essay)
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If voting is costly yet it has no intrinsic value, voting in an election:
(Multiple Choice)
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Once the state environmental protection agency devises its new policy to protect the environment, firms decide whether to remain in the state or move their operations to a neighboring state. In the language of game theory, this is an example of:
(Multiple Choice)
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One possible explanation for low voter turnouts during elections is
(Multiple Choice)
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In numerous business courses, but very few economics courses, there are group projects. The Nash equilibrium for group projects is
(Multiple Choice)
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The Nash equilibrium in a game of plain complements with simultaneous moves:
(Multiple Choice)
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In the case of the team production, the best response functions:
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