Exam 28: Bertrand Russell: The Correspondence Theory of Truth

In this selection Russell first distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowledge by appearances, such as "I seem to see a red book," "I am in pain," or "I think, therefore I am") and knowledge by description (knowledge of truths, such as your knowing that you are really seeing a red book or that your pain is caused by having twisted your ankle). Knowledge by acquaintance is generally thought to be infallible because believing it makes the proposition true. But the same is not the case for descriptive knowledge claims because your beliefs could be false. Thus, descriptive knowledge is dualistic-it has the properties of truth and falsity as opposites-whereas knowledge by acquaintance is monistic and does not admit such opposites. Russell goes on to specify the conditions for an adequate theory of truth and shows how the correspondence theory meets these conditions, whereas the coherence theory does not. -Russell argues that the correspondence theory meets the three requirements of any theory of truth.

In this selection Russell first distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowledge by appearances, such as "I seem to see a red book," "I am in pain," or "I think, therefore I am") and knowledge by description (knowledge of truths, such as your knowing that you are really seeing a red book or that your pain is caused by having twisted your ankle). Knowledge by acquaintance is generally thought to be infallible because believing it makes the proposition true. But the same is not the case for descriptive knowledge claims because your beliefs could be false. Thus, descriptive knowledge is dualistic-it has the properties of truth and falsity as opposites-whereas knowledge by acquaintance is monistic and does not admit such opposites. Russell goes on to specify the conditions for an adequate theory of truth and shows how the correspondence theory meets these conditions, whereas the coherence theory does not. -Russell ponders what is meant by the question whether a belief is true or false.

In this selection Russell first distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowledge by appearances, such as "I seem to see a red book," "I am in pain," or "I think, therefore I am") and knowledge by description (knowledge of truths, such as your knowing that you are really seeing a red book or that your pain is caused by having twisted your ankle). Knowledge by acquaintance is generally thought to be infallible because believing it makes the proposition true. But the same is not the case for descriptive knowledge claims because your beliefs could be false. Thus, descriptive knowledge is dualistic-it has the properties of truth and falsity as opposites-whereas knowledge by acquaintance is monistic and does not admit such opposites. Russell goes on to specify the conditions for an adequate theory of truth and shows how the correspondence theory meets these conditions, whereas the coherence theory does not. -Russell is concerned with the question of how we can know whether a belief is true or false.

In this selection Russell first distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowledge by appearances, such as "I seem to see a red book," "I am in pain," or "I think, therefore I am") and knowledge by description (knowledge of truths, such as your knowing that you are really seeing a red book or that your pain is caused by having twisted your ankle). Knowledge by acquaintance is generally thought to be infallible because believing it makes the proposition true. But the same is not the case for descriptive knowledge claims because your beliefs could be false. Thus, descriptive knowledge is dualistic-it has the properties of truth and falsity as opposites-whereas knowledge by acquaintance is monistic and does not admit such opposites. Russell goes on to specify the conditions for an adequate theory of truth and shows how the correspondence theory meets these conditions, whereas the coherence theory does not. -Russell says that it is common for two rival hypotheses to both be able to account for all the facts.

In this selection Russell first distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowledge by appearances, such as "I seem to see a red book," "I am in pain," or "I think, therefore I am") and knowledge by description (knowledge of truths, such as your knowing that you are really seeing a red book or that your pain is caused by having twisted your ankle). Knowledge by acquaintance is generally thought to be infallible because believing it makes the proposition true. But the same is not the case for descriptive knowledge claims because your beliefs could be false. Thus, descriptive knowledge is dualistic-it has the properties of truth and falsity as opposites-whereas knowledge by acquaintance is monistic and does not admit such opposites. Russell goes on to specify the conditions for an adequate theory of truth and shows how the correspondence theory meets these conditions, whereas the coherence theory does not. -Russell maintains that it is not possible to possess propositional knowledge.

In this selection Russell first distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowledge by appearances, such as "I seem to see a red book," "I am in pain," or "I think, therefore I am") and knowledge by description (knowledge of truths, such as your knowing that you are really seeing a red book or that your pain is caused by having twisted your ankle). Knowledge by acquaintance is generally thought to be infallible because believing it makes the proposition true. But the same is not the case for descriptive knowledge claims because your beliefs could be false. Thus, descriptive knowledge is dualistic-it has the properties of truth and falsity as opposites-whereas knowledge by acquaintance is monistic and does not admit such opposites. Russell goes on to specify the conditions for an adequate theory of truth and shows how the correspondence theory meets these conditions, whereas the coherence theory does not. -Russell is a skeptic.

In this selection Russell first distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowledge by appearances, such as "I seem to see a red book," "I am in pain," or "I think, therefore I am") and knowledge by description (knowledge of truths, such as your knowing that you are really seeing a red book or that your pain is caused by having twisted your ankle). Knowledge by acquaintance is generally thought to be infallible because believing it makes the proposition true. But the same is not the case for descriptive knowledge claims because your beliefs could be false. Thus, descriptive knowledge is dualistic-it has the properties of truth and falsity as opposites-whereas knowledge by acquaintance is monistic and does not admit such opposites. Russell goes on to specify the conditions for an adequate theory of truth and shows how the correspondence theory meets these conditions, whereas the coherence theory does not. -According to Russell, an important objection to the coherence theory of truth is that there is no proof that there can be

In this selection Russell first distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowledge by appearances, such as "I seem to see a red book," "I am in pain," or "I think, therefore I am") and knowledge by description (knowledge of truths, such as your knowing that you are really seeing a red book or that your pain is caused by having twisted your ankle). Knowledge by acquaintance is generally thought to be infallible because believing it makes the proposition true. But the same is not the case for descriptive knowledge claims because your beliefs could be false. Thus, descriptive knowledge is dualistic-it has the properties of truth and falsity as opposites-whereas knowledge by acquaintance is monistic and does not admit such opposites. Russell goes on to specify the conditions for an adequate theory of truth and shows how the correspondence theory meets these conditions, whereas the coherence theory does not. -According to Russell, a theory of truth must

In this selection Russell first distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowledge by appearances, such as "I seem to see a red book," "I am in pain," or "I think, therefore I am") and knowledge by description (knowledge of truths, such as your knowing that you are really seeing a red book or that your pain is caused by having twisted your ankle). Knowledge by acquaintance is generally thought to be infallible because believing it makes the proposition true. But the same is not the case for descriptive knowledge claims because your beliefs could be false. Thus, descriptive knowledge is dualistic-it has the properties of truth and falsity as opposites-whereas knowledge by acquaintance is monistic and does not admit such opposites. Russell goes on to specify the conditions for an adequate theory of truth and shows how the correspondence theory meets these conditions, whereas the coherence theory does not. -According to Russell, truth consists of some form of correspondence between

In this selection Russell first distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowledge by appearances, such as "I seem to see a red book," "I am in pain," or "I think, therefore I am") and knowledge by description (knowledge of truths, such as your knowing that you are really seeing a red book or that your pain is caused by having twisted your ankle). Knowledge by acquaintance is generally thought to be infallible because believing it makes the proposition true. But the same is not the case for descriptive knowledge claims because your beliefs could be false. Thus, descriptive knowledge is dualistic-it has the properties of truth and falsity as opposites-whereas knowledge by acquaintance is monistic and does not admit such opposites. Russell goes on to specify the conditions for an adequate theory of truth and shows how the correspondence theory meets these conditions, whereas the coherence theory does not. -Russell says it is possible to equate the correspondence theory with total skepticism.

In this selection Russell first distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowledge by appearances, such as "I seem to see a red book," "I am in pain," or "I think, therefore I am") and knowledge by description (knowledge of truths, such as your knowing that you are really seeing a red book or that your pain is caused by having twisted your ankle). Knowledge by acquaintance is generally thought to be infallible because believing it makes the proposition true. But the same is not the case for descriptive knowledge claims because your beliefs could be false. Thus, descriptive knowledge is dualistic-it has the properties of truth and falsity as opposites-whereas knowledge by acquaintance is monistic and does not admit such opposites. Russell goes on to specify the conditions for an adequate theory of truth and shows how the correspondence theory meets these conditions, whereas the coherence theory does not. -Russell believes that the coherence theory of truth is at least as plausible as the correspondence theory.

In this selection Russell first distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowledge by appearances, such as "I seem to see a red book," "I am in pain," or "I think, therefore I am") and knowledge by description (knowledge of truths, such as your knowing that you are really seeing a red book or that your pain is caused by having twisted your ankle). Knowledge by acquaintance is generally thought to be infallible because believing it makes the proposition true. But the same is not the case for descriptive knowledge claims because your beliefs could be false. Thus, descriptive knowledge is dualistic-it has the properties of truth and falsity as opposites-whereas knowledge by acquaintance is monistic and does not admit such opposites. Russell goes on to specify the conditions for an adequate theory of truth and shows how the correspondence theory meets these conditions, whereas the coherence theory does not. -Russell says that truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements.

In this selection Russell first distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowledge by appearances, such as "I seem to see a red book," "I am in pain," or "I think, therefore I am") and knowledge by description (knowledge of truths, such as your knowing that you are really seeing a red book or that your pain is caused by having twisted your ankle). Knowledge by acquaintance is generally thought to be infallible because believing it makes the proposition true. But the same is not the case for descriptive knowledge claims because your beliefs could be false. Thus, descriptive knowledge is dualistic-it has the properties of truth and falsity as opposites-whereas knowledge by acquaintance is monistic and does not admit such opposites. Russell goes on to specify the conditions for an adequate theory of truth and shows how the correspondence theory meets these conditions, whereas the coherence theory does not. -Russell says the coherence theory of truth differs only slightly from the correspondence theory.

In this selection Russell first distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowledge by appearances, such as "I seem to see a red book," "I am in pain," or "I think, therefore I am") and knowledge by description (knowledge of truths, such as your knowing that you are really seeing a red book or that your pain is caused by having twisted your ankle). Knowledge by acquaintance is generally thought to be infallible because believing it makes the proposition true. But the same is not the case for descriptive knowledge claims because your beliefs could be false. Thus, descriptive knowledge is dualistic-it has the properties of truth and falsity as opposites-whereas knowledge by acquaintance is monistic and does not admit such opposites. Russell goes on to specify the conditions for an adequate theory of truth and shows how the correspondence theory meets these conditions, whereas the coherence theory does not. -For Russell, minds do not create truth or falsehood.

In this selection Russell first distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., knowledge by appearances, such as "I seem to see a red book," "I am in pain," or "I think, therefore I am") and knowledge by description (knowledge of truths, such as your knowing that you are really seeing a red book or that your pain is caused by having twisted your ankle). Knowledge by acquaintance is generally thought to be infallible because believing it makes the proposition true. But the same is not the case for descriptive knowledge claims because your beliefs could be false. Thus, descriptive knowledge is dualistic-it has the properties of truth and falsity as opposites-whereas knowledge by acquaintance is monistic and does not admit such opposites. Russell goes on to specify the conditions for an adequate theory of truth and shows how the correspondence theory meets these conditions, whereas the coherence theory does not. -According to Russell, the coherence theory of truth presupposes