Exam 15: The Invisible Hand and the First Welfare Theorem
Exam 1: Introduction12 Questions
Exam 2: A Consumers Economic Circumstances26 Questions
Exam 3: Economic Circumstances in Labor and Financial Markets15 Questions
Exam 4: Tastes and Indifference Curves17 Questions
Exam 5: Different Types of Tastes20 Questions
Exam 6: Doing the Best We Can20 Questions
Exam 7: Income and Substitution Effects in Consumer Goods Markets27 Questions
Exam 8: Wealth and Substitution Effects in Labor and Capital Markets19 Questions
Exam 9: Demand for Goods and Supply of Labor and Capital24 Questions
Exam 10: Consumer Surplus and Deadweight Loss28 Questions
Exam 11: One Input and One Output: a Short-Run Producer Model34 Questions
Exam 12: Production With Multiple Inputs34 Questions
Exam 13: Production Decisions in the Short and Long Run31 Questions
Exam 14: Competitive Market Equilibrium24 Questions
Exam 15: The Invisible Hand and the First Welfare Theorem24 Questions
Exam 16: General Equilibrium25 Questions
Exam 17: Choice and Markets in the Presence of Risk26 Questions
Exam 18: Elasticities, Price-Distorting Policies, and Non-Price Rationing28 Questions
Exam 19: Distortionary Taxes and Subsidies32 Questions
Exam 20: Prices and Distortions Across Markets22 Questions
Exam 21: Externalities in Competitive Markets25 Questions
Exam 22: Asymmetric Information in Competitive Markets24 Questions
Exam 23: Monopoly38 Questions
Exam 24: Strategic Thinking and Game Theory37 Questions
Exam 25: Oligopoly22 Questions
Exam 26: Product Differentiation and Innovation in Markets16 Questions
Exam 27: Public Goods21 Questions
Exam 28: Governments and Politics19 Questions
Exam 29: What Is Good Challenges From Psychology and Philosophy23 Questions
Select questions type
A "social planner" is a fictional societal planner who would always choose the same outcome as the competitive market.
(True/False)
4.8/5
(37)
Which of the following is true about competitive equilibria in environments where the conditions of the first welfare theorem are satisfied?
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(39)
If the individuals in a group of consumers have identical tastes, then the group can be treated as if it behaved as a singe representative consumer.
(True/False)
4.9/5
(38)
In a 2-good model, if individuals in a group all have tastes that are quasilinear in good 1, then we can treat the group as if it was a single representative consumer.
(True/False)
4.8/5
(41)
Showing 21 - 24 of 24
Filters
- Essay(0)
- Multiple Choice(0)
- Short Answer(0)
- True False(0)
- Matching(0)