Exam 24: Strategic Thinking and Game Theory

Consider player n in a sequential game. a.If the player can play 2 actions from a single node, how many pure strategies does he have? b.Suppose he can play 2 actions at each of two different nodes.How many pure strategies does he have now? c.Suppose he can play 2 actions at each of three different nodes.How many pure strategies does he have now? d.Suppose he can play 2 actions at each of four different nodes.How many pure strategies does he have now? e.Suppose he can play 2 actions at each of k different nodes.How many pure strategies does he have now?

(Essay)

4.8/5

(36)

Question 21

If a player's strategy in a sequential game is to choose an action that stops the game early on, it is unnecessary to specify that player's plans for moves later on in the game when it would have been his turn to move again.

(True/False)

4.8/5

(28)

Question 22

If a pooling equilibrium is played in a signaling game, beliefs about the sender type can take on any form along the branch of the game tree that is not played in equilibrium, but on the branch that is played, beliefs are identical to the probability distribution with which "nature" assigned types to the sender.

(True/False)

4.7/5

(44)

Question 23

Bayesian updating in a separating equilibrium implies the initially uninformed player will fully know what type he is playing when he has to make his move.

(True/False)

4.9/5

(42)

Question 24

If there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a complete information game, there is a mixed strategy equilibrium, and if there is no mixed strategy equilibrium, there is a pure strategy equilibrium.

(True/False)

4.8/5

(37)

Question 25

Suppose a player in a sequential game has 2 potential decision nodes, with 5 possible actions at each node.Then he has 25 possible pure strategies.

(True/False)

4.9/5

(33)

Question 26

A complete information game is a special case of an incomplete information game -- where "Nature" assigns each player a "type" with probability 1.

(True/False)

4.7/5

(39)

Question 27

If all players in a game have a dominant strategy, then there can only be one pure strategy Nash equilibrium to the game.

(True/False)

4.8/5

(40)

Question 28

In a Prisoners' Dilemma, both players are willing to pay to be forced to cooperate.

(True/False)

4.8/5

(32)

Question 29

If we depict a simultaneous move, complete information game in a game tree, each player only has one information set no matter how many players there are in the game.

(True/False)

4.7/5

(37)

Question 30

In simultaneous move Bayesian games, a player's beliefs are fully given by the probability distribution used by "Nature" to assign types.

(True/False)

4.8/5

(38)

Question 31

Consider the following sequential move game: a.What are the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in this game? b.List all possible strategies for the two players. c.Illustrate this game in a payoff matrix. d.Indicate the Nash equilibria in the payoff matrix from (c). e.What makes some of the Nash equilibria not subgame perfect?

(Essay)

4.9/5

(44)

Question 32

In mixed strategy Nash equilibria, players play each of two pure strategies with probability 0.5.

(True/False)

5.0/5

(36)

Question 33

In a simultaneous move, incomplete information game in which player 1 is unsure of which of two types player 2 is, player 1's strategy must include an action for each possible type that player 2 might be, but player 2 only needs to pick one action since he knows what type he is.

(True/False)

4.8/5

(27)

Question 34

Consider player n in a sequential game. a.If the player can play 3 actions from a single node, how many pure strategies does he have? b.Suppose he can play 3 actions at each of two different nodes.How many pure strategies does he have now? c.Suppose he can play 3 actions at each of three different nodes.How many pure strategies does he have now? d.Suppose he can play 3 actions at each of four different nodes.How many pure strategies does he have now? e.Suppose he can play 3 actions at each of k different nodes.How many pure strategies does he have now?

(Essay)

4.8/5

(29)

Question 35

Complete information sequential games can be represented in payoff matrices and complete information simultaneous games can be represented in game trees with information sets.

(True/False)

4.8/5

(39)

Question 36

Suppose a player in a sequential game has 5 potential decision nodes, with 2 possible actions at each node.Then he has 25 possible pure strategies.

(True/False)

4.9/5

(36)

Question 37

Showing 21 - 37 of 37

Exam 24: Strategic Thinking and Game Theory

If a player's strategy in a sequential game is to choose an action that stops the game early on, it is unnecessary to specify that player's plans for moves later on in the game when it would have been his turn to move again.

Bayesian updating in a separating equilibrium implies the initially uninformed player will fully know what type he is playing when he has to make his move.

If there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a complete information game, there is a mixed strategy equilibrium, and if there is no mixed strategy equilibrium, there is a pure strategy equilibrium.

Suppose a player in a sequential game has 2 potential decision nodes, with 5 possible actions at each node.Then he has 25 possible pure strategies.

A complete information game is a special case of an incomplete information game -- where "Nature" assigns each player a "type" with probability 1.

If all players in a game have a dominant strategy, then there can only be one pure strategy Nash equilibrium to the game.

In a Prisoners' Dilemma, both players are willing to pay to be forced to cooperate.

If we depict a simultaneous move, complete information game in a game tree, each player only has one information set no matter how many players there are in the game.

In simultaneous move Bayesian games, a player's beliefs are fully given by the probability distribution used by "Nature" to assign types.

In mixed strategy Nash equilibria, players play each of two pure strategies with probability 0.5.

In a simultaneous move, incomplete information game in which player 1 is unsure of which of two types player 2 is, player 1's strategy must include an action for each possible type that player 2 might be, but player 2 only needs to pick one action since he knows what type he is.

Complete information sequential games can be represented in payoff matrices and complete information simultaneous games can be represented in game trees with information sets.

Suppose a player in a sequential game has 5 potential decision nodes, with 2 possible actions at each node.Then he has 25 possible pure strategies.

Introduction

A Consumers Economic Circumstances

Economic Circumstances in Labor and Financial Markets

Tastes and Indifference Curves

Different Types of Tastes

Doing the Best We Can

Income and Substitution Effects in Consumer Goods Markets

Wealth and Substitution Effects in Labor and Capital Markets

Demand for Goods and Supply of Labor and Capital

Consumer Surplus and Deadweight Loss

One Input and One Output: a Short-Run Producer Model

Production With Multiple Inputs

Production Decisions in the Short and Long Run

Competitive Market Equilibrium

The Invisible Hand and the First Welfare Theorem

General Equilibrium

Choice and Markets in the Presence of Risk

Elasticities, Price-Distorting Policies, and Non-Price Rationing

Distortionary Taxes and Subsidies

Prices and Distortions Across Markets

Externalities in Competitive Markets

Asymmetric Information in Competitive Markets

Monopoly

Oligopoly

Product Differentiation and Innovation in Markets

Public Goods

Governments and Politics

What Is Good Challenges From Psychology and Philosophy

Filters