Exam 13: Imperfect Competition

Which of the following factors might explain why the long-run equilibrium number of firms can in some instances exceed the socially optimal number?

The Stackelberg outcome differs from the Cournot equilibrium because:

All of the following are problems associated with maintaining a cartel except that:

Each firm in a cartel has an incentive to chisel because market price exceeds:

In the Hotelling model of spatial competition,profits arise from:

The Nash equilibrium in a Bertrand game in which firms produce perfect substitutes and have equal marginal costs is:

In a Cournot equilibrium,each firm chooses an output level which:

The Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game in which two identical firms face market demand And have costs is given by :

In the Hotelling model,what effect would an increase in the transportation cost t have on,in the first instance,a monopoly firm and,in the second instance,two firms located at the extremes of the line segment who compete over the marginal consumer?

How does the leader's behavior in the quantity-leadership (Stackelberg)game compare to that in the analogous price-leadership game?

The more a firm invests in a new production technology,the lower its marginal costs.Which of the following scenarios involving this incumbent firm and a potential entrant makes the least economic sense?

A firm's first-order condition from the Cournot game with general demands and costs is:

A cartel-like collusive solution can be a Nash equilibrium only in price-setting games with:

The Nash equilibrium in a Bertrand game of price setting where all firms have different marginal cost is:

What factor would not help resolve the Bertrand paradox (that a perfectly competitive outcome can emerge with as few as two firms in the market)if the basic Bertrand model were extended to include it?

Suppose n identical firms engage in Bertrand competition in a stage game repeated infinitely often.What condition on the discount factor Is required for firms to be able to tacitly collude on the monopoly industry output?

A profit-maximizing firm should spend an additional dollar on advertising so long as this expenditure results in more than one dollar of:

Which feature of a market would contribute most to overall social welfare?

Product differentiation complicates the study of oligopolies because such markets may not:

The subgame-perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game in which firms first choose capacities and then engage in a Bertrand price setting game resembles the equilibrium in: