Question 1

The strategy profile in which both players remain silent in the Prisoners' Dilemma can be described as:

Accepted Answer

A) non-Pareto optimal and unstable. 
B) Pareto optimal and unstable. 
C) non-Pareto optimal and stable. 
D) Pareto optimal and stable. 
A) non-Pareto optimal and unstable. 
B) Pareto optimal and unstable. 
C) non-Pareto optimal and stable. 
D) Pareto optimal and stable. B

Question 2

The general message of the folk theorems is:

Accepted Answer

A) Nash equilibria may not be sustainable over many replications of a game. 
B) payoffs that are unambiguously preferred to Nash equilibria may be sustainable over many replications of a game. 
C) credible threats may inhibit the achievement of mutually beneficial outcomes over many replications of a game. 
D) just plain folk play the best games. 
A) Nash equilibria may not be sustainable over many replications of a game. 
B) payoffs that are unambiguously preferred to Nash equilibria may be sustainable over many replications of a game. 
C) credible threats may inhibit the achievement of mutually beneficial outcomes over many replications of a game. 
D) just plain folk play the best games. B

Question 3

A game of incomplete information is distinct from one of complete information in that players:

Accepted Answer

A) do not observe each others' actions. 
B) do not know each others' payoff functions. 
C) do not know the timing of moves. 
D) use mixed strategies. 
A) do not observe each others' actions. 
B) do not know each others' payoff functions. 
C) do not know the timing of moves. 
D) use mixed strategies. B

Question 4

Which of the following is a true statement about signaling games?

Accepted Answer

A) In a separating equilibrium,the second mover's posterior beliefs are the same as his priors. 
B) In a separating equilibrium,Bayes' rule cannot be used to compute posterior beliefs (because it produces an undefined answer). 
C) In a pooling equilibrium,both the first and second movers choose the same action. 
D) In a pooling equilibrium,the second mover learns nothing from the first mover's action. 
A) In a separating equilibrium,the second mover's posterior beliefs are the same as his priors. 
B) In a separating equilibrium,Bayes' rule cannot be used to compute posterior beliefs (because it produces an undefined answer). 
C) In a pooling equilibrium,both the first and second movers choose the same action. 
D) In a pooling equilibrium,the second mover learns nothing from the first mover's action.

Question 5

Consider a sequential game in which the police move first,choosing which of two sites to defend,  And   ,against terrorism.After observing this choice,the terrorist moves second,choosing which site to attack.The attack only succeeds against an undefended target.A successful attack on   Causes more damage than against   The police's objective is to minimize and the terrorist's to maximize damage.What outcome characterizes the subgame perfect equilibrium? ​

Accepted Answer

A) ​Cannot tell without more information 
B) ​Police defends  ,and terrorist attacks   
C) ​Police defends  ,and terrorist attacks   
D) ​Police randomize between targets 
A) ​Cannot tell without more information 
B) ​Police defends  ,and terrorist attacks   
C) ​Police defends  ,and terrorist attacks   
D) ​Police randomize between targets

Question 6

Use the following table to answer the questions :  
-In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium,a player is willing to randomize because:

Accepted Answer

A) this confuses opponents. 
B) he or she is indifferent between the actions in equilibrium. 
C) the actions provide the same payoffs regardless of what the other player does. 
D) he or she does not know what the other player is doing. 
A) this confuses opponents. 
B) he or she is indifferent between the actions in equilibrium. 
C) the actions provide the same payoffs regardless of what the other player does. 
D) he or she does not know what the other player is doing.

Question 7

How does the dictator game differ from the ultimatum game?

Accepted Answer

A) ​The responder can dictate whether the offer is accepted or not. 
B) ​The responder has no choice but to accept the proposal. 
C) ​The experimenter takes over the proposer's role,inserting an offer designed to test a hypothesis. 
D) ​If the responder rejects,the proposer obtains the whole "pie." 
A) ​The responder can dictate whether the offer is accepted or not. 
B) ​The responder has no choice but to accept the proposal. 
C) ​The experimenter takes over the proposer's role,inserting an offer designed to test a hypothesis. 
D) ​If the responder rejects,the proposer obtains the whole "pie."

Question 8

A subgame-perfect equilibrium:

Accepted Answer

A) is not a Nash equilibrium;it is a refinement of Nash equilibrium. 
B) is an equilibrium concept used in simultaneous games. 
C) is a special sort of Nash equilibrium. 
D) can be ruled out using backward induction. 
A) is not a Nash equilibrium;it is a refinement of Nash equilibrium. 
B) is an equilibrium concept used in simultaneous games. 
C) is a special sort of Nash equilibrium. 
D) can be ruled out using backward induction.

Question 9

Consider a version of the Tragedy of the Commons in which herder 1 and 2 simultaneously choose to graze quantities of sheep   And  ,respectively,and in which the payoff functions are  For 1 and  For 2.The Nash equilibrium is

Accepted Answer

A) 100. 
B) 60. 
C) 40. 
D) 33.3. 
A) 100. 
B) 60. 
C) 40. 
D) 33.3.

Question 10

A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies that are mutual:

Accepted Answer

A) best responses. 
B) dominant strategies. 
C) Pareto optima. 
D) all of the above. 
A) best responses. 
B) dominant strategies. 
C) Pareto optima. 
D) all of the above.

Question 11

Nash equilibria:

Accepted Answer

A) always exist in pure strategies. 
B) generally come in even numbers. 
C) always exist in finite games. 
D) all of the above. 
A) always exist in pure strategies. 
B) generally come in even numbers. 
C) always exist in finite games. 
D) all of the above.

Question 12

Which statement is true of the Battle of the Sexes game?

Accepted Answer

A) It is a coordination game. 
B) The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium provides players with lower expected payoffs than other equilibria. 
C) The first mover has an advantage in the sequential version. 
D) All of the above. 
A) It is a coordination game. 
B) The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium provides players with lower expected payoffs than other equilibria. 
C) The first mover has an advantage in the sequential version. 
D) All of the above.

Question 13

The difference between a Nash equilibrium and a subgame-perfect equilibrium is:

Accepted Answer

A) the former requires rational play both on and off the equilibrium path but the latter requires rational play only on the equilibrium path. 
B) the former requires rational play only on the equilibrium path but the latter requires rational play both on and off the equilibrium path. 
C) Nash equilibria are a subset of the subgame-perfect equilibria. 
D) nothing;they are synonyms. 
A) the former requires rational play both on and off the equilibrium path but the latter requires rational play only on the equilibrium path. 
B) the former requires rational play only on the equilibrium path but the latter requires rational play both on and off the equilibrium path. 
C) Nash equilibria are a subset of the subgame-perfect equilibria. 
D) nothing;they are synonyms.

Question 14

The difference between a Nash equilibrium strategy and a dominant strategy is:

Accepted Answer

A) nothing;they are synonymous. 
B) the former is stable but the latter is unstable. 
C) the former must be a best response to all others' strategy profiles,whereas the latter need only be a best response to others' Nash equilibrium strategies. 
D) the former need only be a best response to others' Nash equilibrium strategies,whereas the latter must be a best response to all others' strategy profiles. 
A) nothing;they are synonymous. 
B) the former is stable but the latter is unstable. 
C) the former must be a best response to all others' strategy profiles,whereas the latter need only be a best response to others' Nash equilibrium strategies. 
D) the former need only be a best response to others' Nash equilibrium strategies,whereas the latter must be a best response to all others' strategy profiles.

Question 15

Use the following table to answer the questions :  
-What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the following game?

Accepted Answer

A) Both play A. 
B) Both play B. 
C) Two equilibria: both play B in one and both play C in the other. 
D) Two equilibria: 1 plays B and 2 plays A and vice versa. 
A) Both play A. 
B) Both play B. 
C) Two equilibria: both play B in one and both play C in the other. 
D) Two equilibria: 1 plays B and 2 plays A and vice versa.

Question 16

For an infinitely repeated game promising A per period with continuing cooperation,B for the one period gain from cheating and C per period for the non-cooperative solution (B > A > C)will have a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in trigger strategies providing:

Accepted Answer

A)    
B)    
C)    
D)    
A)    
B)    
C)    
D)

Question 17

Use the following table to answer the questions :  
-In the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the following game in which players randomize between B and C and do not play A at all,what is the probability that each plays B?

Accepted Answer

A) 3/4 
B) 1/2 
C) 1/4 
D) 1/3 
A) 3/4 
B) 1/2 
C) 1/4 
D) 1/3

Question 18

In the separating equilibrium of the Spence education signaling game in which the high type gets an education,which is a true statement about the firm's posterior belief that the worker who shows up with no education is the low type?

Accepted Answer

A)    
B)    
C)    
D)    
A)    
B)    
C)    
D)

Question 19

In experimental tests of the ultimatum game:

Accepted Answer

A) the proposer often offers an even split of the "pie",and responders often reject smaller offers,consistent with the predictions of game theory. 
B) the proposer often offers an even split of the "pie",and responders often reject smaller offers,in contrast to the predictions of game theory. 
C) the proposer often offers an unfair split,taking the lion's share of the "pie" for him or herself,and responders often accept such offers,consistent with the predictions of game theory. 
D) the proposer often offers an unfair split,taking the lion's share of the "pie" for him or herself,and responders often accept such offers,in contrast to the predictions of game theory. 
A) the proposer often offers an even split of the "pie",and responders often reject smaller offers,consistent with the predictions of game theory. 
B) the proposer often offers an even split of the "pie",and responders often reject smaller offers,in contrast to the predictions of game theory. 
C) the proposer often offers an unfair split,taking the lion's share of the "pie" for him or herself,and responders often accept such offers,consistent with the predictions of game theory. 
D) the proposer often offers an unfair split,taking the lion's share of the "pie" for him or herself,and responders often accept such offers,in contrast to the predictions of game theory.

Question 20

Consider a version of the Tragedy of the Commons in which herder 1 and 2 simultaneously choose to graze quantities of sheep  And  
,respectively.If herder 1's payoff function is  ,his or her best response function is:

Accepted Answer

A)    
B)    
C)    
D)    
A)    
B)    
C)    
D)

The strategy profile in which both players remain silent in the Prisoners' Dilemma can be described as:

The general message of the folk theorems is:

A game of incomplete information is distinct from one of complete information in that players:

Which of the following is a true statement about signaling games?

Use the following table to answer the questions : -In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium,a player is willing to randomize because:

How does the dictator game differ from the ultimatum game?

A subgame-perfect equilibrium:

Consider a version of the Tragedy of the Commons in which herder 1 and 2 simultaneously choose to graze quantities of sheep And ,respectively,and in which the payoff functions are For 1 and For 2.The Nash equilibrium is

A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies that are mutual:

Nash equilibria:

Which statement is true of the Battle of the Sexes game?

The difference between a Nash equilibrium and a subgame-perfect equilibrium is:

The difference between a Nash equilibrium strategy and a dominant strategy is:

Use the following table to answer the questions : -What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the following game?

For an infinitely repeated game promising A per period with continuing cooperation,B for the one period gain from cheating and C per period for the non-cooperative solution (B > A > C)will have a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in trigger strategies providing:

Use the following table to answer the questions : -In the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the following game in which players randomize between B and C and do not play A at all,what is the probability that each plays B?

In the separating equilibrium of the Spence education signaling game in which the high type gets an education,which is a true statement about the firm's posterior belief that the worker who shows up with no education is the low type?

In experimental tests of the ultimatum game:

Consider a version of the Tragedy of the Commons in which herder 1 and 2 simultaneously choose to graze quantities of sheep And ,respectively.If herder 1's payoff function is ,his or her best response function is:

Preferences and Utility

Utility Maximization and Choice

Income and Substitution Effects

Demand Relationships Among Goods

Uncertainty

Production Functions

Cost Functions

Profit Maximization

The Partial Equilibrium Competitive Model

General Equilibrium and Welfare

Monopoly

Imperfect Competition

Labor Markets

Capital and Time

Asymmetric Information

Externalities and Public Goods

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Exam 6: Game Theory

The strategy profile in which both players remain silent in the Prisoners' Dilemma can be described as:

The general message of the folk theorems is:

A game of incomplete information is distinct from one of complete information in that players:

Which of the following is a true statement about signaling games?

Use the following table to answer the questions : -In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium,a player is willing to randomize because:

How does the dictator game differ from the ultimatum game?

A subgame-perfect equilibrium:

Consider a version of the Tragedy of the Commons in which herder 1 and 2 simultaneously choose to graze quantities of sheep And ,respectively,and in which the payoff functions are For 1 and For 2.The Nash equilibrium is

A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies that are mutual:

Nash equilibria:

Which statement is true of the Battle of the Sexes game?

The difference between a Nash equilibrium and a subgame-perfect equilibrium is:

The difference between a Nash equilibrium strategy and a dominant strategy is:

Use the following table to answer the questions : -What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the following game?

For an infinitely repeated game promising A per period with continuing cooperation,B for the one period gain from cheating and C per period for the non-cooperative solution (B > A > C)will have a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in trigger strategies providing:

Use the following table to answer the questions : -In the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the following game in which players randomize between B and C and do not play A at all,what is the probability that each plays B?

In the separating equilibrium of the Spence education signaling game in which the high type gets an education,which is a true statement about the firm's posterior belief that the worker who shows up with no education is the low type?

In experimental tests of the ultimatum game:

Consider a version of the Tragedy of the Commons in which herder 1 and 2 simultaneously choose to graze quantities of sheep And ,respectively.If herder 1's payoff function is ,his or her best response function is:

Preferences and Utility

Utility Maximization and Choice

Income and Substitution Effects

Demand Relationships Among Goods

Uncertainty

Production Functions

Cost Functions

Profit Maximization

The Partial Equilibrium Competitive Model

General Equilibrium and Welfare

Monopoly

Imperfect Competition

Labor Markets

Capital and Time

Asymmetric Information

Externalities and Public Goods

Filters