Exam 16: Asymmetric Information
Exam 1: Preferences and Utility14 Questions
Exam 2: Utility Maximization and Choice15 Questions
Exam 3: Income and Substitution Effects22 Questions
Exam 4: Demand Relationships Among Goods18 Questions
Exam 5: Uncertainty19 Questions
Exam 6: Game Theory20 Questions
Exam 7: Production Functions14 Questions
Exam 8: Cost Functions20 Questions
Exam 9: Profit Maximization32 Questions
Exam 10: The Partial Equilibrium Competitive Model32 Questions
Exam 11: General Equilibrium and Welfare24 Questions
Exam 12: Monopoly22 Questions
Exam 13: Imperfect Competition21 Questions
Exam 14: Labor Markets20 Questions
Exam 15: Capital and Time20 Questions
Exam 16: Asymmetric Information18 Questions
Exam 17: Externalities and Public Goods25 Questions
Select questions type
Suppose that you were again competing in a sealed-bid auction for the Vermeer painting which you value at $100,000,but now it is a first-price auction.What bid should you submit?
Free
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(40)
Correct Answer:
B
Let
Be the manager's salary in an owner-manager version of the principal-agent problem.Which of the following is characteristic of a "powerful" incentive scheme?

Free
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(36)
Correct Answer:
D
Unlike an owner,a manager may be more concerned with _____ than with _____.Which pair of words best completes this sentence?
Free
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(37)
Correct Answer:
B
Which statement is true if the monopolist can observe the consumer's type in the nonlinear-pricing application?
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(33)
Fill in the blanks: _____ is an important constraint in the moral-hazard problem because _____.
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(47)
What tradeoffs are present in the moral-hazard-in-insurance problem?
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(33)
Consider a firm composed of 5 workers,each with a utility function of the form
,where l is hours worked and w is the wage.Suppose the firm can monitor the number of hours worked by each worker and pays them
Per hour.How many hours will each worker choose to work?


(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(45)
Which of the following is not a straightforward example of a (principal
Agent) relationship?

(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(32)
Compared to the case in which a monopoly insurer offers the consumer a contract,if insurance is competitively provided:
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(30)
What is the term for the contract that maximizes the principal's payoff subject to the constraint that the principal lacks the agent's private information?
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(30)
Which statement best characterizes the second-best policy offered by a monopoly insurer when it can't observe the consumer's risk?
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(37)
Adverse selection can arise in employment situations if information about worker quality is:
(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(41)
Continue to suppose as in the previous question that the utility function for each of the firm's 5 workers is
,where l is hours worked and w is the wage.Suppose now that the firm can only monitor the total hours worked by the group and pay each worker an equal share of the wage
Times the total number of hours.How many hours will each worker choose to work?


(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(36)
When the monopoly insurer cannot observe the care taken by the insured party to avoid an accident,the most profitable contract for it:
(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(34)
In the 1980s,it became increasingly common for consumers to sign two-year leases rather than buying the cars outright.As these leases expired,the supply of used cars expanded considerably.How would the addition of this large volume of off-lease cars influence the possibility of a lemons problem on the used-car market?
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(35)
Which contracting party gains from the use of a more sophisticated contract?
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(40)
Suppose you were competing in a sealed-bid,second-price auction for a Vermeer painting,which you happen to value at $100,000.What bid should you submit?
(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(44)
Filters
- Essay(0)
- Multiple Choice(0)
- Short Answer(0)
- True False(0)
- Matching(0)