Exam 28: Game Applications
Exam 1: Budget Constraint58 Questions
Exam 1: A: Budget Constraint30 Questions
Exam 2: Preferences49 Questions
Exam 2: A: Preferences30 Questions
Exam 3: Utility57 Questions
Exam 3: A: Utility29 Questions
Exam 4: Choice63 Questions
Exam 4: A: Choice31 Questions
Exam 5: Demand79 Questions
Exam 5: A: Demand22 Questions
Exam 6: Revealed Preference58 Questions
Exam 6: A: Revealed Preference26 Questions
Exam 7: Slutsky Equation51 Questions
Exam 7: A: Slutsky Equation30 Questions
Exam 8: Buying and Selling75 Questions
Exam 8: A: Buying and Selling30 Questions
Exam 9: Intertemporal Choice61 Questions
Exam 9: A: Intertemporal Choice30 Questions
Exam 10: Asset Markets46 Questions
Exam 10: A: Asset Markets30 Questions
Exam 11: Uncertainty39 Questions
Exam 11: A: Uncertainty25 Questions
Exam 12: Risky Assets16 Questions
Exam 12: A: Risky Assets10 Questions
Exam 13: Consumers Surplus42 Questions
Exam 13: A: Consumers Surplus30 Questions
Exam 14: Market Demand101 Questions
Exam 14: A: Market Demand25 Questions
Exam 15: Equilibrium48 Questions
Exam 15: A: Equilibrium20 Questions
Exam 16: Auctions36 Questions
Exam 16: A: Auctions25 Questions
Exam 17: Technology52 Questions
Exam 17: A: Technology30 Questions
Exam 18: Profit Maximization52 Questions
Exam 18: A: Profit Maximization21 Questions
Exam 19: Cost Minimization77 Questions
Exam 19: A: Cost Minimization26 Questions
Exam 20: Cost Curves51 Questions
Exam 20: A: Cost Curves20 Questions
Exam 21: Firm Supply41 Questions
Exam 21: A: Firm Supply15 Questions
Exam 22: Industry Supply49 Questions
Exam 22: A: Industry Supply33 Questions
Exam 23: Monopoly76 Questions
Exam 23: A: Monopoly30 Questions
Exam 24: Monopoly Behavior34 Questions
Exam 24: A: Monopoly Behavior20 Questions
Exam 25: Factor Markets24 Questions
Exam 25: A: Factor Markets20 Questions
Exam 26: Oligopoly56 Questions
Exam 26: A: Oligopoly30 Questions
Exam 27: Game Theory34 Questions
Exam 27: A: Game Theory25 Questions
Exam 28: Game Applications28 Questions
Exam 28: A: Game Applications25 Questions
Exam 29: Behavioral Economics34 Questions
Exam 30: Exchange68 Questions
Exam 30: A: Exchange30 Questions
Exam 31: Production35 Questions
Exam 31: A: Production25 Questions
Exam 32: Welfare27 Questions
Exam 32: A: Welfare25 Questions
Exam 33: Externalities42 Questions
Exam 33: A: Externalities25 Questions
Exam 34: Information Technology24 Questions
Exam 34: A: Information Technology15 Questions
Exam 35: Public Goods26 Questions
Exam 35: A: Public Goods20 Questions
Exam 36: Asymmetric Information31 Questions
Exam 36: A: Asymmetric Information20 Questions
Select questions type
Alec and Kim used to be much better friends than they are now. The problem is what to do about Christmas gifts? If they wait until Christmas morning and move simultaneously, their payoff matrix is
Kim
Under the circumstances, Alec should publicly announce at Thanksgiving that he is not buying a Christmas gift for Kim.

(True/False)
4.7/5
(36)
Consider the goalie's anxiety at the penalty kick. Let the kicker's payoffs below represent the kicker's probability of success and the goalie's payoffs the probability of failure. Goalie
The goalie should defend left with probability

(Multiple Choice)
4.9/5
(40)
Suppose AMD is considering cloning Intel's latest CPU chip. If AMD enters Intel's market, Intel can play Mean, expand its output, drop prices, and try to make AMD's profit as small as possible or play Nice by cutting back its output and sharing the market. AMD and Intel both know that after all moves are complete, the time-discounted profits of future chip production in billions of dollars are Intel
Assuming AMD moves first, which of the following is the Nash equilibrium for sequential play?

(Multiple Choice)
4.8/5
(39)
Recall from the movie Dr. Strangelove, General Turgison (played by George C. Scott) remarks, "Boy, I sure wish we had one of those Doomsday Machines." If both the United States and the Soviet Union possess a Doomsday Machine, the payoffs for a simultaneous attack are as follows:
U.S.S.R.
Would it be desirable from the U.S. perspective to have its own Doomsday Machine? Explain why or why not?

(Essay)
4.9/5
(42)
In a small isolated town, there are two types of people, saints and crooks. In business dealings between any two residents of this town, the payoffs are below.
What percentage of this town's residents would be saints in an evolutionary stable strategy?

(Multiple Choice)
5.0/5
(47)
In the classic 1960s macabre comedy Dr. Strangelove, the Soviet Union constructed a Doomsday Machine which would end all life on earth if ever the Soviet Union were attacked. In the movie, the existence of the Doomsday Machine was kept secret. This would enhance the effectiveness of such a machine.
(True/False)
4.9/5
(26)
Alec and Kim used to be much better friends than they are now. The problem is what to do about Christmas gifts? If they wait until Christmas morning and move simultaneously, their payoff matrix is Kim
If Alec commits at Thanksgiving time not to buy a gift for Kim, Kim will find it in her best interest

(Multiple Choice)
4.7/5
(35)
An equilibrium in a sequential game is always a Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous game with equivalent payoffs.
(True/False)
4.8/5
(32)
Showing 21 - 28 of 28
Filters
- Essay(0)
- Multiple Choice(0)
- Short Answer(0)
- True False(0)
- Matching(0)