Exam 28: Game Applications-Part A
Exam 1: Budget Constraint-Part A59 Questions
Exam 1: Budget Constraint-Part B35 Questions
Exam 2: Preferences-Part A49 Questions
Exam 2: Preferences-Part B30 Questions
Exam 3: Utility-Part A57 Questions
Exam 3: Utility-Part B30 Questions
Exam 4: Choice-Part A64 Questions
Exam 4: Choice-Part B31 Questions
Exam 5: Demand-Part A80 Questions
Exam 5: Demand-Part B36 Questions
Exam 6: Revealed Preference-Part A58 Questions
Exam 6: Revealed Preference-Part B26 Questions
Exam 7: Slutsky Equation-Part A51 Questions
Exam 7: Slutsky Equation-Part B30 Questions
Exam 8: Buying and Selling-Part A75 Questions
Exam 8: Buying and Selling-Part B30 Questions
Exam 9: Intertemporal Choice-Part A61 Questions
Exam 9: Intertemporal Choice-Part B31 Questions
Exam 10: Asset Markets-Part A46 Questions
Exam 10: Asset Markets-Part B30 Questions
Exam 11: Uncertainty-Part A39 Questions
Exam 11: Uncertainty-Part B24 Questions
Exam 12: Risky Assets-Part A16 Questions
Exam 12: Risky Assets-Part B10 Questions
Exam 13: Consumers Surplus-Part A42 Questions
Exam 13: Consumers Surplus-Part B30 Questions
Exam 14: Market Demand-Part A101 Questions
Exam 14: Market Demand-Part B25 Questions
Exam 15: Equilibrium-Part A48 Questions
Exam 15: Equilibrium-Part B20 Questions
Exam 16: Auctions-Part A36 Questions
Exam 16: Auctions-Part B25 Questions
Exam 17: Technology-Part A52 Questions
Exam 17: Technology-Part B30 Questions
Exam 18: Profit Maximization-Part A53 Questions
Exam 18: Profit Maximization-Part B21 Questions
Exam 19: Cost Minimization-Part A78 Questions
Exam 19: Cost Minimization-Part B26 Questions
Exam 20: Cost Curves-Part A53 Questions
Exam 20: Cost Curves-Part B25 Questions
Exam 21: Firm Supply-Part A46 Questions
Exam 21: Firm Supply-Part B15 Questions
Exam 22: Industry Supply-Part A49 Questions
Exam 22: Industry Supply-Part B33 Questions
Exam 23: Monopoly-Part A76 Questions
Exam 23: Monopoly-Part B35 Questions
Exam 24: Monopoly Behavior-Part A34 Questions
Exam 24: Monopoly Behavior-Part B20 Questions
Exam 25: Factor Markets-Part A24 Questions
Exam 25: Factor Markets-Part B20 Questions
Exam 26: Oligopoly-Part A55 Questions
Exam 26: Oligopoly-Part B25 Questions
Exam 27: Game Theory-Part A34 Questions
Exam 27: Game Theory-Part B25 Questions
Exam 28: Game Applications-Part A34 Questions
Exam 28: Game Applications-Part B25 Questions
Exam 29: Behavioral Economics34 Questions
Exam 30: Exchange-Part A72 Questions
Exam 30: Exchange-Part B30 Questions
Exam 31: Production-Part A35 Questions
Exam 31: Production-Part B25 Questions
Exam 32: Welfare-Part A27 Questions
Exam 32: Welfare-Part B25 Questions
Exam 33: Externalities-Part A42 Questions
Exam 33: Externalities-Part B25 Questions
Exam 34: Information Technology-Part A24 Questions
Exam 34: Information Technology-Part B15 Questions
Exam 35: Public Goods-Part A26 Questions
Exam 35: Public Goods-Part B15 Questions
Exam 36: Asymmetric Information-Part A31 Questions
Exam 36: Asymmetric Information-Part B20 Questions
Select questions type
Suppose AMD is considering cloning Intel's latest CPU chip.If AMD enters Intel's market, Intel can play Mean, expand its output, drop prices, and try to make AMD's profit as small as possible or play Nice by cutting back its output and sharing the market.AMD and Intel both know that after all moves are complete, the time-discounted profits of future chip production in billions of dollars are
Assuming AMD moves first, which of the following is the Nash equilibrium for sequential play?

(Multiple Choice)
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In the little town of Gas Pump, South Dakota, there are two gas stations across the street from each other, the East station and the West station.A local ordinance requires that they are permitted to change the price of gasoline only once a week at precisely 8:00a.m.on Monday and in 5 cent increments.For some time, the price of gasoline has been stable at $1.50 per gallon, but midweek, the price each station pays for gasoline changed to $1.44.Given the payoff matrix below, which of the following strategies is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium?


(Multiple Choice)
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Alec and Kim used to be much better friends than they are now.The problem is what to do about Christmas gifts? If they wait until Christmas morning and move simultaneously, their payoff matrix is
If Alec commits at Thanksgiving time not to buy a gift for Kim, Kim will find it in her best interest

(Multiple Choice)
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Suppose Boeing and Airbus are both considering expanding their plant capacity as a strategic move but can't observe their opponent's move until their own move has been determined.The following are time-discounted values of all future profit streams in billions of dollars.Which of the following strategies are Nash equilibria? 

(Multiple Choice)
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Suppose AMD is considering cloning Intel's latest CPU chip.If AMD enters Intel's market, Intel can play Mean, expand its output, drop prices, and try to make AMD's profit as small as possible or play Nice by cutting back its output and sharing the market.AMD and Intel both know that after all moves are complete, the time-discounted profits of future chip production in billions of dollars are
Assuming AMD moves first, which of the following is the Nash equilibrium for sequential play?

(Multiple Choice)
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Alec and Kim used to be much better friends than they are now.The problem is what to do about Christmas gifts? If they wait until Christmas morning and move simultaneously, their payoff matrix is
Under the circumstances, Alec should publicly announce at Thanksgiving that he is not buying a Christmas gift for Kim.

(True/False)
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Suppose AMD is considering cloning Intel's latest CPU chip.If AMD enters Intel's market, Intel can play Mean, expand its output, drop prices, and try to make AMD's profit as small as possible or play Nice by cutting back its output and sharing the market.AMD and Intel both know that after all moves are complete, the time-discounted profits of future chip production in billions of dollars are
Assuming AMD moves first, which of the following is the Nash equilibrium for sequential play?

(Multiple Choice)
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Alec and Kim used to be much better friends than they are now.The problem is what to do about Christmas gifts? If they wait until Christmas morning and move simultaneously, their payoff matrix is
If Kim is worried that Alec is going to announce publicly what he is going to do at Thanksgiving, Kim would definitely be made better off by announcing her action publicly at Halloween.

(True/False)
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Consider the goa lie's anxiety at the penalty kick.Let the kicker's payoffs below represent the kicker's probability of success and the goalie's payoffs the probability of failure.
The goalie should defend left with probability

(Multiple Choice)
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In the classic 1960s macabre comedy Dr.Strangelove, the Soviet Union constructed a Doomsday Machine which would end all life on earth if ever the Soviet Union were attacked.When playing against a rational opponent, the existence of such a machine would be of great benefit to the Soviets.
(True/False)
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Consider the goalie's anxiety at the penalty kick.Let the kicker's payoffs below represent the kicker's probability of success and the goalie's payoffs the probability of failure.
The goalie should defend left with probability

(Multiple Choice)
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Consider the goalie's anxiety at the penalty kick.Let the kicker's payoffs below represent the kicker's probability of success and the goalie's payoffs the probability of failure.
The goalie should defend left with probability

(Multiple Choice)
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Recall from the movie Dr.Strangelove, General Turgison (played by George C.Scott)remarks, "Boy, I sure wish we had one of those Doomsday Machines." If both the United States and the Soviet Union possess a Doomsday Machine, the payoffs for a simultaneous attack are as follows:
Would it be desirable from the U.S.perspective to have its own Doomsday Machine? Explain why or why not?

(Essay)
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In a small isolated town, there are two types of people, saints and crooks.In business dealings between any two residents of this town, the payoffs are below.
What percentage of this town's residents would be saints in an evolutionary stable strategy?

(Multiple Choice)
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