Exam 29:Game Theory-Part A

A famous Big Ten football coach had only two strategies,Run the ball to the left side of the line and Run the ball to the right side.The defense can concentrate forces on the left side or the right side.If the opponent concentrates on the wrong side,his offense is sure to gain at least 5 yards.If the defense defended the left side and the offense ran left,the offense gained only 1 yard.If the opponent defended the right side when the offense ran right,the offense would still gain at least 5 yards with probability .70.It is the last play of the game and the famous coach's team is on offense.If it makes 5 yards or more,it wins;if not,it loses.Both sides choose Nash equilibrium strategies.In equilibrium the offense

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 21

In Nash equilibrium,each player is making an optimal choice for herself,given the choices of the other players.

(True/False)

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Question 22

A famous Big Ten football coach had only two strategies,Run the ball to the left side of the line and Run the ball to the right side.The defense can concentrate forces on the left side or the right side.If the opponent concentrates on the wrong side,his offense is sure to gain at least 5 yards.If the defense defended the left side and the offense ran left,the offense gained only 1 yard.If the opponent defended the right side when the offense ran right,the offense would still gain at least 5 yards with probability .50.It is the last play of the game and the famous coach's team is on offense.If it makes 5 yards or more,it wins;if not,it loses.Both sides choose Nash equilibrium strategies.In equilibrium the offense

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 23

A dominant strategy equilibrium is a set of choices such that each player's choices are optimal regardless of what the other players choose.

(True/False)

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Question 24

A famous Big Ten football coach had only two strategies,Run the ball to the left side of the line and Run the ball to the right side.The defense can concentrate forces on the left side or the right side.If the opponent concentrates on the wrong side,his offense is sure to gain at least 5 yards.If the defense defended the left side and the offense ran left,the offense gained only 1 yard.If the opponent defended the right side when the offense ran right,the offense would still gain at least 5 yards with probability .30.It is the last play of the game and the famous coach's team is on offense.If it makes 5 yards or more,it wins;if not,it loses.Both sides choose Nash equilibrium strategies.In equilibrium the offense

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 25

If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X,then the number of people who will attend next week is 90 + 0.40X.What is a long-run equilibrium attendance for this club?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 26

Frank and Nancy met at a sorority sock hop.They agreed to meet for a date at a local bar the next week.Regrettably,they were so fraught with passion that they forgot to agree on which bar would be the site of their rendezvous.Luckily,the town has only two bars,Rizotti's and the Oasis.Having discussed their tastes in bars at the sock hop,both are aware that Frank prefers Rizotti's to the Oasis and Nancy prefer the Oasis to Rizotti's.In fact,the payoffs are as follows.If both go to the Oasis,Nancy's utility is 3 and Frank's utility is 2.If both go to Rizotti's,Frank's utility is 3 and Nancy's utility is 2.If they don't both go to the same bar,both have a utility of 0.

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 27

A game has two players and each has two strategies.The strategies are Be Nice and Be Mean.If both players play Be Nice,both get a payoff of 5.If both players play Be Mean,both get a payoff of 23.If one player plays Be Nice and the other plays Be Mean,the player who played Be Nice gets 0 and the player who played Be Mean gets 10.Playing Be Mean is a dominant strategy for both players.

(True/False)

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Question 28

Two players are engaged in a game of Chicken.There are two possible strategies,Swerve and Drive Straight.A player who chooses to Swerve is called Chicken and gets a payoff of zero,regardless of what the other player does.A player who chooses to Drive Straight gets a payoff of 36 if the other player swerves and a payoff of -36 if the other player also chooses to Drive Straight.This game has two pure strategy equilibria and

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 29

In a Nash equilibrium,everyone must be playing a dominant strategy.

(True/False)

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Question 30

Professor Binmore has a monopoly in the market for undergraduate game theory textbooks.The time-discounted value of Professor Binmore's future earnings is $2,000.Professor Ditt is considering writing a book to compete with Professor Binmore's book.With two books amicably splitting the market,the time-discounted value of each professor's future earnings would be $200.If there is full information (each professor knows the profits of the other),under what conditions could Professor Binmore deter the entry of Professor Ditt into his market?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 31

While game theory predicts noncooperative behavior for a single play of the prisoner's dilemma,it would predict cooperative tit-for-tat behavior if the same people play prisoner's dilemma together for,say,20 rounds.

(True/False)

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Question 32

Big Pig and Little Pig have two possible strategies,Press the Button,and Wait at the Trough.If both pigs choose Wait at the Trough,both get 2.If both pigs choose Press the Button,then both pigs get 5.If Little Pig presses the button and Big Pig waits at the trough,then Big Pig gets 10 and Little Pig gets 0.Finally,if Big Pig presses the button and Little Pig waits at the trough,then Big Pig gets 3 and Little Pig gets 2.In Nash equilibrium,

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 33

Showing 21 - 33 of 33

Exam 29:Game Theory-Part A

In Nash equilibrium,each player is making an optimal choice for herself,given the choices of the other players.

A dominant strategy equilibrium is a set of choices such that each player's choices are optimal regardless of what the other players choose.

If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X,then the number of people who will attend next week is 90 + 0.40X.What is a long-run equilibrium attendance for this club?

In a Nash equilibrium,everyone must be playing a dominant strategy.

While game theory predicts noncooperative behavior for a single play of the prisoner's dilemma,it would predict cooperative tit-for-tat behavior if the same people play prisoner's dilemma together for,say,20 rounds.

Demand-Part A

Revealed Preference-Part A

Revealed Preference-Part B

Slutsky Equation-Part A

Slutsky Equation-Part B

Buying and Selling-Part A

Buying and Selling-Part B

Intertemporal Choice-Part A

Intertemporal Choice-Part B

Asset Markets-Part A

Asset Markets-Part B

Uncertainty-Part A

Uncertainty-Part B

Risky Assets-Part A

Risky Assets-Part B

Consumers Surplus-Part A

Consumers Surplus-Part B

Market Demand-Part A

Market Demand-Part B

Equilibrium-Part A

Equilibrium-Part B

Auctions-Part A

Auctions-Part B

Technology-Part A

Technology-Part B

Profit Maximization-Part A

Profit Maximization-Part B

Cost Minimization-Part A

Cost Minimization-Part B

Cost Curves-Part A

Cost Curves-Part B

Firm Supply-Part A

Firm Supply-Part B

Industry Supply-Part A

Industry Supply-Part B

Monopoly-Part A

Monopoly-Part B

Monopoly Behavior-Part A

Monopoly Behavior-Part B

Factor Markets-Part A

Factor Markets-Part B

Oligopoly-Part A

Oligopoly-Part B

Game Theory-Part B

Game Applications-Part A

Game Applications-Part B

Behavioral Economics-Part A

Exchange-Part A

Exchange-Part B

Production-Part A

Production-Part B

Welfare-Part A

Welfare-Part B

Externalities-Part A

Externalities-Part B

Information Technology-Part A

Information Technology-Part B

Public Goods-Part A

Public Goods-Part B

Asymmetric Information-Part A

Asymmetric Information-Part B

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