Exam 13: Game Theory and Competitive Strategy

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Scenario 13.17 Consider the entry-deterrence game below. The potential entrant would have to spend some amount in sunk costs to enter the market. Scenario 13.17 Consider the entry-deterrence game below. The potential entrant would have to spend some amount in sunk costs to enter the market.   -Refer to Scenario 13.17. If the Incumbent Monopoly installed excess capacity in advance of the Potential Entrant's appearance on the scene, and this excess capacity had a cost of $X, it would reduce by $X the Incumbent Monopoly's payoffs in the -Refer to Scenario 13.17. If the Incumbent Monopoly installed excess capacity in advance of the Potential Entrant's appearance on the scene, and this excess capacity had a cost of $X, it would reduce by $X the Incumbent Monopoly's payoffs in the

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Scenario 13.17 Consider the entry-deterrence game below. The potential entrant would have to spend some amount in sunk costs to enter the market. Scenario 13.17 Consider the entry-deterrence game below. The potential entrant would have to spend some amount in sunk costs to enter the market.   -In the game in Scenario 13.17, Incumbent Monopoly has -In the game in Scenario 13.17, Incumbent Monopoly has

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Your firm needs a private investigator and the best private eye in Santa Teresa is Kinsey Milhone. Her services are worth $30,000 to your firm but you do not want to pay her more than $10,000. You tell Kinsey that you cannot pay her more than $10,000 unless you get prior approval from the Board of Directors of your company, and, unfortunately, they just met and won't meet again for 6 months. This strategic move on your part gives you ________ flexibility and ________ bargaining power.

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What is true about threats in the game in Scenario 13.15?

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Scenario 13.16 Consider the pricing game below: Scenario 13.16 Consider the pricing game below:   -Refer to Scenario 13.16. If Gooi can move first, and Ici threatens to buy yogurt machines, no matter what Gooi does, -Refer to Scenario 13.16. If Gooi can move first, and Ici threatens to buy yogurt machines, no matter what Gooi does,

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Scenario 13.10 Consider the game below: Scenario 13.10 Consider the game below:   -What is true about dominant strategies in the game in Scenario 13.10? -What is true about dominant strategies in the game in Scenario 13.10?

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An auction in which a seller begins by offering an item for sale at a relatively high price and then reduces the price by fixed amounts until receiving a bid is known as a:

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Scenario 13.9 Consider the following game: Two firms are situated next to a lake, and it costs each firm $1,500 per period to use filters that avoid polluting the lake. However, each firm must use the lake's water in production, so it is also costly to have a polluted lake. The cost to each firm of dealing with water from a polluted lake is $1,000 times the number of polluting firms. Scenario 13.9 Consider the following game: Two firms are situated next to a lake, and it costs each firm $1,500 per period to use filters that avoid polluting the lake. However, each firm must use the lake's water in production, so it is also costly to have a polluted lake. The cost to each firm of dealing with water from a polluted lake is $1,000 times the number of polluting firms.   -What is true about dominant strategies in the game in Scenario 13.9? -What is true about dominant strategies in the game in Scenario 13.9?

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Two firms in a local market compete in the manufacture of cyberwidgets. Each firm must decide if they will offer a warranty or not. The pay-offs of each firm's strategy is a function of their competitor as well. The pay-off matrix is presented below. Two firms in a local market compete in the manufacture of cyberwidgets. Each firm must decide if they will offer a warranty or not. The pay-offs of each firm's strategy is a function of their competitor as well. The pay-off matrix is presented below.    If firm #1 announces it will offer a warranty regardless of what firm #2 does, is this a credible threat? Why or why not? If firm #1 announces it will offer a warranty regardless of what firm #2 does, is this a credible threat? Why or why not?

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Scenario 13.2: Consider the following game: Scenario 13.2: Consider the following game:   -In the game in Scenario 13.2, the equilibrium strategies -In the game in Scenario 13.2, the equilibrium strategies

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