Exam 12: Game Theory
Exam 1: Adventures in Microeconomics20 Questions
Exam 2: Supply and Demand148 Questions
Exam 3: Using Supply and Demand to Analyze Markets146 Questions
Exam 4: Consumer Behavior130 Questions
Exam 5: Individual and Market Demand146 Questions
Exam 6: Producer Behavior142 Questions
Exam 7: Costs179 Questions
Exam 8: Supply in a Competitive Market148 Questions
Exam 9: Market Power and Monopoly162 Questions
Exam 10: Market Power and Pricing Strategies165 Questions
Exam 11: Imperfect Competition172 Questions
Exam 12: Game Theory170 Questions
Exam 13: Factor Markets94 Questions
Exam 14: Investment, Time, and Insurance117 Questions
Exam 15: General Equilibrium97 Questions
Exam 16: Asymmetric Information106 Questions
Exam 17: Externalities and Public Goods114 Questions
Exam 18: Behavioral and Experimental Economics112 Questions
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(Figure: Feely Mattress and Mealy Mattress I) Payoffs are profits in millions of dollars.
Should Mealy Mattress develop its anti-bedbug mattress if Feely Mattress promises not to develop its own anti-bedbug mattress?

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(Multiple Choice)
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Correct Answer:
C
(Table: Firms 1 and 2 IV) Payoffs represent profits in millions of dollars.
If Firm 2 chooses right, the best strategy for Firm 1 is ____.

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(Multiple Choice)
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Correct Answer:
B
Robert and Rosalie are deciding whether to request fish or chicken at a wedding that they will attend. If they order different meals, they can try each of the dishes by sharing. Their payoffs in terms of their happiness are as follows.
There is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium at ____.

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(Multiple Choice)
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Correct Answer:
B
Suppose that, in a two-player game, player A can move Up or Down, and player B can choose Left or Right. Payoffs for this game are given in the table:
There exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium at which Player B plays Left with probability ____.

(Multiple Choice)
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(Table: Hitter and Pitcher I)
A mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium in this game is ____.

(Multiple Choice)
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Lala and Kohar hope to be roommates and are choosing between two apartments. Their payoffs are as given in the table:
a. What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria if any?
b. What is the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium?

(Essay)
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(Table: Firms 1 and 2 IV) Payoffs represent profits in millions of dollars.
If Firm 2 chooses left, the best strategy for Firm 1 is ____.

(Multiple Choice)
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Suppose the payoffs for players A and B, given their respective strategies, are as in the table:
There is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium at _____.

(Multiple Choice)
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The following game has a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which Row plays Up with probability _____ and Column plays Left with probability _____. 

(Multiple Choice)
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(Table: Firms A and B X) Two firms have formed an agreement to restrict output.
They are playing an infinitely repeated game in which output decisions must be made every period. Both firms are using grim trigger strategies.
If d (discount rate) = 0.80, Firm B's expected payoff from following the agreement is ____.

(Multiple Choice)
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Dennis and Denise are trying to decide whether to go hiking or biking this weekend. Depending on their choices, they might go together or they might go apart. Their payoffs in terms of their happiness are as follows.
There is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium at ____.

(Multiple Choice)
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(Table: Fresh Fruit Market and Spoiled Not Food I) Payoffs are in thousands of dollars.
a. Does Fresh Fruit Market have a dominant strategy?
b. Does Spoiled Not Food have a dominant strategy?
c. Solve for any Nash equilibria.

(Essay)
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(Figure: Firms A and B V)
Which figure corresponds to the following normal-form game? 


(Multiple Choice)
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(Table: Lemonade) Andrei and Sonya operate lemonade stands in the same neighborhood.
Payoffs are in quarters . The kids have formed an agreement to restrict output. They are playing an infinitely repeated game in which output decisions must be made every period and both of them are using tit-for-tat trigger strategies. If the discount rate is d = 0.25, then the players ____.

(Multiple Choice)
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Kelly and Karl can vote for or against a public project. Their payoffs are given in the table:
There is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium at ____.

(Multiple Choice)
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Consider a simultaneous game for two players. Each player has a choice between two strategies, Friend and Foe. If both players play Friend, each wins $1,000. If both play Foe, they win nothing. If one plays Foe and the other plays Friend, the Foe wins $2,000 and the Friend wins nothing. Which of the following statements is (are) TRUE?
I. This game has a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
II. This game has a pure-strategy equilibrium.
III. The Nash equilibrium is for both players to play Friend.
(Multiple Choice)
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