Exam 15: Incentive Compensation
Exam 1: Introduction29 Questions
Exam 2: Economists View of Behavior43 Questions
Exam 3: Markets, Organizations, and the Role of Knowledge43 Questions
Exam 4: Demand31 Questions
Exam 5: Production and Cost36 Questions
Exam 6: Market Structure47 Questions
Exam 7: Pricing With Market Power40 Questions
Exam 8: Economics of Strategy: Creating and Capturing Value41 Questions
Exam 9: Economics of Strategy: Game Theory32 Questions
Exam 10: Incentive Conflicts and Contracts39 Questions
Exam 11: Organizational Architecture39 Questions
Exam 12: Decision Rights: The Level of Empowerment37 Questions
Exam 13: Decision Rights: Bundling Tasks Into Jobs and Subunits36 Questions
Exam 14: Attracting and Retaining Qualified Employees44 Questions
Exam 15: Incentive Compensation38 Questions
Exam 16: Individual Performance Evaluation39 Questions
Exam 17: Divisional Performance Evaluation36 Questions
Exam 18: Corporate Governance39 Questions
Exam 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing43 Questions
Exam 20: Leadership: Motivating Change Within Organizations41 Questions
Exam 21: Understanding the Business Environment: The Economics of Regulation40 Questions
Exam 22: Ethics and Organizational Architecture38 Questions
Exam 23: Organizational Architecture and the Process of Management Innovation32 Questions
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The DuPont case is a good example of an incentive package gone awry. In review, it placed a portion of employee's pay into an "at-risk pool." If the division had exceeded expectations, the employees would have received a bonus from the pool. How would a "relative performance contract" have saved the DuPont bonus system?
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(Essay)
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Correct Answer:
DuPont could have benchmarked its division's profits against performance by other firms in other relevant markets. However, there are several relevant markets, e.g. housing, automobiles, apparel. It would be tricky to assign weights to those markets. Another option would have been to judge the division relative to other DuPont divisions. Poor overall economic performance would also affect some other divisions. The problem with this plan is that some divisions would be harder hit than others, depending which sectors were hit hardest by the recession and by high input prices. The advantage is that the employees would not likely have been faced with significant financial losses.
When employees are offered incentives to find new customers, but the aggregate economy is so weak (in recession) that the firm loses consumers, then the incentive plan:
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Correct Answer:
C
There is scientific evidence to suggest that:
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Correct Answer:
A
Dan Heath is the owner of Plain Truth Advertising. He is attempting to design salary systems for his employees, most of whom are sales agents. To get a good system, he needs to recognize the trade-offs between:
(Multiple Choice)
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Economists believe the free rider problem is very important in complex business organizational structures. Still, businesses continue to build teams to solve problems or to deliver products to consumers. Often special rewards or bonuses are provided to the team rather than to the individuals on the team. Write a brief essay that either defends the economists' concern or explain why economists are wrong on this issue.
(Essay)
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Since the1980s, the compensation of CEOs in large corporations has been increasingly tied to performance of the common stock of the company. Research now indicates that if the value of the firm changes by $1,000, the wealth of CEO changes by:
(Multiple Choice)
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Consider the salary of Mary Sue Nelson, a sales agent for Plain Truth Advertising. Her wage package is W = 1,000 + .4Q, where Q is her dollar volume of sales. Her productivity is Q = 200e +
, where e denotes her hours of effort and m is a random variable with mean 0. She has an effort cost of C = e2. Under this contract, her choice of effort will be:

(Multiple Choice)
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Team production is a limiting factor as a solution to incentive problems since:
(Multiple Choice)
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Three difficulties that limit the usefulness of ownership in resolving incentive problems are:
(Multiple Choice)
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An efficient allocation of risk among employees and owners must:
(Multiple Choice)
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A compensation program that includes all performance indicators that influence an employee's output is called the:
(Multiple Choice)
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Consider the salary of Mary Sue Nelson, a sales agent for Plain Truth Advertising. Her wage package is W = 1,000 + .4Q, where Q is her dollar volume of sales. Her productivity is Q = 200e +
, where e denotes her hours of effort and m is a random variable with mean 0. She has an effort cost of C = e2 . Under this contract, the expected value of her total wages will be:

(Multiple Choice)
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To qualify as incentive pay, a performance-based compensation program:
(Multiple Choice)
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If all issues of effort, output, and pay are fully observable and contactable between an owner and an employee, then:
(Multiple Choice)
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One possible solution to an incentive problem arising under unobservable actions is:
(Multiple Choice)
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What are the factors that favor high incentive pay for an employee? Explain which of the five factors is the most important.
(Essay)
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