Question 1

-Consider game depicted in Figure 11.3 in which Left moves first. The payoffs for the subgame-perfect equilibrium for this game are:

Accepted Answer

A)  (3, 2). 
B)  (1, 4). 
C)  (2, 3). 
D)  (2, 2). 
E)  (1, 5). 
A)  (3, 2). 
B)  (1, 4). 
C)  (2, 3). 
D)  (2, 2). 
E)  (1, 5). A

Question 2

-Consider game depicted in Figure 11.3 in which Left moves first. This multistage game has how many subgames?

Accepted Answer

A)  1 
B)  2 
C)  3 
D)  4 
E)  5 
A)  1 
B)  2 
C)  3 
D)  4 
E)  5 E

Question 3

-Consider again the multi stage-game in Figure 11.4 in which Homer moves first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

Accepted Answer

A)  {Bart 6 Lisa} 
B)  {Bart 6 Maggie} 
C)  {Lisa 6 Bart} 
D)  {Maggie 6 Maggie} 
E)  This game does not have a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
A)  {Bart 6 Lisa} 
B)  {Bart 6 Maggie} 
C)  {Lisa 6 Bart} 
D)  {Maggie 6 Maggie} 
E)  This game does not have a subgame perfect equilibrium. B

Question 4

-Refer to Figure 11.7. If larger payoffs are preferred, which player has a strictly dominant strategy?

Accepted Answer

A)  Player A 
B)  Player B 
C)  Both players 
D)  Neither player 
E)  Cannot be determined on the basis of the information provided. 
A)  Player A 
B)  Player B 
C)  Both players 
D)  Neither player 
E)  Cannot be determined on the basis of the information provided.

Question 5

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.1 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many proper subgames?

Accepted Answer

A)  0 
B)  1 
C)  2 
D)  3 
E)  4 
A)  0 
B)  1 
C)  2 
D)  3 
E)  4

Question 6

A player has a first-mover advantage:

Accepted Answer

A)  If he or she is able to obtain a payoff that is no worse than if all players moved simultaneously. 
B)  Will always obtain the highest possible payoff. 
C)  Only in games in which all players have dominant strategies. 
D)  Only in games in which none of the players have dominant strategies. 
E)  None of the above. 
A)  If he or she is able to obtain a payoff that is no worse than if all players moved simultaneously. 
B)  Will always obtain the highest possible payoff. 
C)  Only in games in which all players have dominant strategies. 
D)  Only in games in which none of the players have dominant strategies. 
E)  None of the above.

Question 7

-Consider the one-time, noncooperative, static game depicted in Figure 11.6. If larger payoffs are preferred, which player has an iterated strictly dominant strategy?

Accepted Answer

A)  P1 
B)  P2 
C)  Both players 
D)  Neither player 
E)  Cannot be determined on the basis of the information provided. 
A)  P1 
B)  P2 
C)  Both players 
D)  Neither player 
E)  Cannot be determined on the basis of the information provided.

Question 8

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.2 in which player A moves first. The payoffs for the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game are:

Accepted Answer

A)  (300, 225). 
B)  (250, 125). 
C)  (150, 240). 
D)  (175, 250). 
E)  (75, 350). 
A)  (300, 225). 
B)  (250, 125). 
C)  (150, 240). 
D)  (175, 250). 
E)  (75, 350).

Question 9

-Refer to Figure 11.7. If larger payoffs are preferred, which player has an iterated strictly dominant strategy?

Accepted Answer

A)  Player A 
B)  Player B 
C)  Both players 
D)  Neither player 
E)  Cannot be determined on the basis of the information provided. 
A)  Player A 
B)  Player B 
C)  Both players 
D)  Neither player 
E)  Cannot be determined on the basis of the information provided.

Question 10

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.5 is modeled as a multistage game with Magna Corporation moving first. The payoffs to both companies from a subgame perfect equilibrium are:

Accepted Answer

A)  (25, 10). 
B)  (30, 15). 
C)  (10, 25). 
D)  (20, 20). 
E)  (25, 25). 
A)  (25, 10). 
B)  (30, 15). 
C)  (10, 25). 
D)  (20, 20). 
E)  (25, 25).

Question 11

In multistage games, every decision node is:

Accepted Answer

A)  The solution to a subgame. 
B)  A Nash equilibrium. 
C)  A subgame perfect equilibrium. 
D)  A subroot. 
E)  All of the above. 
A)  The solution to a subgame. 
B)  A Nash equilibrium. 
C)  A subgame perfect equilibrium. 
D)  A subroot. 
E)  All of the above.

Question 12

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.5 is modeled as a multistage game with Magna Corporation moving first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

Accepted Answer

A)  {Extensive 6 None} 
B)  {Moderate 6 None} 
C)  {None 6 Extensive} 
D)  {Moderate 6 Moderate} 
E)  {None 6 None} 
A)  {Extensive 6 None} 
B)  {Moderate 6 None} 
C)  {None 6 Extensive} 
D)  {Moderate 6 Moderate} 
E)  {None 6 None}

Question 13

-Consider game depicted in Figure 11.3 in which Left moves first. This multistage game has how many trivial subgames?

Accepted Answer

A)  1 
B)  2 
C)  3 
D)  4 
E)  5 
A)  1 
B)  2 
C)  3 
D)  4 
E)  5

Question 14

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.2 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many subgames?

Accepted Answer

A)  0 
B)  1 
C)  2 
D)  3 
E)  4 
A)  0 
B)  1 
C)  2 
D)  3 
E)  4

Question 15

A subgame-perfect equilibrium:

Accepted Answer

A)  Is a Nash equilibrium to a multistage game. 
B)  Is a solution to a subgame in a multistage game. 
C)  Is a solution to any stage of a multistage game. 
D)  Can only exist in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria. 
E)  None of the above. 
A)  Is a Nash equilibrium to a multistage game. 
B)  Is a solution to a subgame in a multistage game. 
C)  Is a solution to any stage of a multistage game. 
D)  Can only exist in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria. 
E)  None of the above.

Question 16

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.6 is modeled as a sequential move game in which P1 moves first and the payoffs are (P2, P1). The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

Accepted Answer

A)  {F ? A}. 
B)  {D ? B}. 
C)  {D ? C}. 
D)  {E ? C}. 
E)  {F ? C}. 
A)  {F ? A}. 
B)  {D ? B}. 
C)  {D ? C}. 
D)  {E ? C}. 
E)  {F ? C}.

Question 17

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.2 in which player A moves first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

Accepted Answer

A)  {1 ? 2}. 
B)  {2 ? 3}. 
C)  {2 ? 1}. 
D)  {3 ? 2}. 
E)  {3 ? 1}. 
A)  {1 ? 2}. 
B)  {2 ? 3}. 
C)  {2 ? 1}. 
D)  {3 ? 2}. 
E)  {3 ? 1}.

Question 18

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.1 in which player A moves first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

Accepted Answer

A)  {1 ? 2}. 
B)  {2 ? 3}. 
C)  {2 ? 1}. 
D)  {3 ? 2}. 
E)  {3 ? 1}. 
A)  {1 ? 2}. 
B)  {2 ? 3}. 
C)  {2 ? 1}. 
D)  {3 ? 2}. 
E)  {3 ? 1}.

Question 19

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.2 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many proper subgames?

Accepted Answer

A)  0 
B)  1 
C)  2 
D)  3 
E)  4 
A)  0 
B)  1 
C)  2 
D)  3 
E)  4

Question 20

If both firms in a duopolistic industry face identical demands and identical total production costs, then:

Accepted Answer

A)  Total industry output predicted by the Stackelberg duopoly model will less than total industry output predicted by the Cournot duopoly model. 
B)  Total industry output predicted by the Stackelberg duopoly model will greater than total industry output predicted by the Cournot duopoly model. 
C)  Total industry output predicted by the Stackelberg duopoly model will be the same as total industry output predicted by the Cournot duopoly model. 
D)  None of the above. It is more appropriate to compare the Stackelberg duopoly model with the Bertrand duopoly model. 
A)  Total industry output predicted by the Stackelberg duopoly model will less than total industry output predicted by the Cournot duopoly model. 
B)  Total industry output predicted by the Stackelberg duopoly model will greater than total industry output predicted by the Cournot duopoly model. 
C)  Total industry output predicted by the Stackelberg duopoly model will be the same as total industry output predicted by the Cournot duopoly model. 
D)  None of the above. It is more appropriate to compare the Stackelberg duopoly model with the Bertrand duopoly model.

-Consider game depicted in Figure 11.3 in which Left moves first. The payoffs for the subgame-perfect equilibrium for this game are:

-Consider game depicted in Figure 11.3 in which Left moves first. This multistage game has how many subgames?

-Consider again the multi stage-game in Figure 11.4 in which Homer moves first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

-Refer to Figure 11.7. If larger payoffs are preferred, which player has a strictly dominant strategy?

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.1 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many proper subgames?

A player has a first-mover advantage:

-Consider the one-time, noncooperative, static game depicted in Figure 11.6. If larger payoffs are preferred, which player has an iterated strictly dominant strategy?

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.2 in which player A moves first. The payoffs for the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game are:

-Refer to Figure 11.7. If larger payoffs are preferred, which player has an iterated strictly dominant strategy?

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.5 is modeled as a multistage game with Magna Corporation moving first. The payoffs to both companies from a subgame perfect equilibrium are:

In multistage games, every decision node is:

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.5 is modeled as a multistage game with Magna Corporation moving first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

-Consider game depicted in Figure 11.3 in which Left moves first. This multistage game has how many trivial subgames?

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.2 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many subgames?

A subgame-perfect equilibrium:

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.6 is modeled as a sequential move game in which P1 moves first and the payoffs are (P2, P1). The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.2 in which player A moves first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.1 in which player A moves first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.2 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many proper subgames?

If both firms in a duopolistic industry face identical demands and identical total production costs, then:

Introduction to Game Theory

Noncooperative, One-Time, Static Games

Focal-Point and Evolutionary Equilibria

Infinitely-Repeated, Static Games

Finitely-Repeated, Static Games

Mixing Pure Strategies

Static Games With Continuous Strategies

Imperfect Competition

Perfect Competition and Monopoly

Strategic Trade Policy

Bargaining

Pure Strategies With Uncertain Payoffs

Torts and Contracts

Auctions

Dynamic Games With Incomplete Information

Filters

Exam 11: Dynamic Games With Complete

-Consider game depicted in Figure 11.3 in which Left moves first. The payoffs for the subgame-perfect equilibrium for this game are:

-Consider game depicted in Figure 11.3 in which Left moves first. This multistage game has how many subgames?

-Consider again the multi stage-game in Figure 11.4 in which Homer moves first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

-Refer to Figure 11.7. If larger payoffs are preferred, which player has a strictly dominant strategy?

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.1 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many proper subgames?

A player has a first-mover advantage:

-Consider the one-time, noncooperative, static game depicted in Figure 11.6. If larger payoffs are preferred, which player has an iterated strictly dominant strategy?

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.2 in which player A moves first. The payoffs for the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game are:

-Refer to Figure 11.7. If larger payoffs are preferred, which player has an iterated strictly dominant strategy?

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.5 is modeled as a multistage game with Magna Corporation moving first. The payoffs to both companies from a subgame perfect equilibrium are:

In multistage games, every decision node is:

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.5 is modeled as a multistage game with Magna Corporation moving first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

-Consider game depicted in Figure 11.3 in which Left moves first. This multistage game has how many trivial subgames?

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.2 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many subgames?

A subgame-perfect equilibrium:

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.6 is modeled as a sequential move game in which P1 moves first and the payoffs are (P2, P1). The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.2 in which player A moves first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.1 in which player A moves first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.2 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many proper subgames?

If both firms in a duopolistic industry face identical demands and identical total production costs, then:

Introduction to Game Theory

Noncooperative, One-Time, Static Games

Focal-Point and Evolutionary Equilibria

Infinitely-Repeated, Static Games

Finitely-Repeated, Static Games

Mixing Pure Strategies

Static Games With Continuous Strategies

Imperfect Competition

Perfect Competition and Monopoly

Strategic Trade Policy

Bargaining

Pure Strategies With Uncertain Payoffs

Torts and Contracts

Auctions

Dynamic Games With Incomplete Information

Filters