Question 1

A decision node:

Accepted Answer

A)  May be the root or subroot of an extensive-form game. 
B)  Is where a player must decide how to move. 
C)  May lead to another decision node. 
D)  May lead to a terminal node. 
E)  All of the above are correct. 
A)  May be the root or subroot of an extensive-form game. 
B)  Is where a player must decide how to move. 
C)  May lead to another decision node. 
D)  May lead to a terminal node. 
E)  All of the above are correct.

Question 2

-Consider game depicted in Figure 11.3 in which Left moves first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

Accepted Answer

A)  {Down}. 
B)  {Up ? Up}. 
C)  {Up ? Down ? Up ? Down}. 
D)  {Up ? Down ? Up ? Up}. 
E)  {Up 6 Down ? Down ? Down}. 
A)  {Down}. 
B)  {Up ? Up}. 
C)  {Up ? Down ? Up ? Down}. 
D)  {Up ? Down ? Up ? Up}. 
E)  {Up 6 Down ? Down ? Down}.

Question 3

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.7 is modeled as a sequential move game with Player A moving first and the payoffs are (Player A, Player B). The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

Accepted Answer

A)  {A3 6 B3} 
B)  {A2 6 B1} 
C)  {A1 6 B3} 
D)  {A3 6 B1} 
E)  None of the above. This game has multiple subgame perfect equilibria 
A)  {A3 6 B3} 
B)  {A2 6 B1} 
C)  {A1 6 B3} 
D)  {A3 6 B1} 
E)  None of the above. This game has multiple subgame perfect equilibria

Question 4

-Consider the one-time, noncooperative, static game depicted in Figure 11.6. If larger payoffs are preferred, which player has a strictly dominant strategy?

Accepted Answer

A)  P1 
B)  P2 
C)  Both players 
D)  Neither player 
E)  Cannot be determined on the basis of the information provided. 
A)  P1 
B)  P2 
C)  Both players 
D)  Neither player 
E)  Cannot be determined on the basis of the information provided.

Question 5

A subgame-perfect equilibrium:

Accepted Answer

A)  Is the solution to an extensive form game. 
B)  Can be found using the method of backward induction. 
C)  Is a Nash equilibrium for a sequential-move game. 
D)  All of the above. 
E)  None of the above. 
A)  Is the solution to an extensive form game. 
B)  Can be found using the method of backward induction. 
C)  Is a Nash equilibrium for a sequential-move game. 
D)  All of the above. 
E)  None of the above.

Question 6

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.7 is modeled as a sequential move game with Player A moving first and the payoffs are (Player A, Player B). The payoffs for this game are:

Accepted Answer

A)  (5, 2). 
B)  (2, 3). 
C)  (2, 4). 
D)  (3, 2). 
E)  None of the above are correct. 
A)  (5, 2). 
B)  (2, 3). 
C)  (2, 4). 
D)  (3, 2). 
E)  None of the above are correct.

Question 7

-Consider game depicted in Figure 11.3 in which Left moves first. This multistage game has how many proper subgames?

Accepted Answer

A)  1 
B)  2 
C)  3 
D)  4 
E)  5 
A)  1 
B)  2 
C)  3 
D)  4 
E)  5

Question 8

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.6 is modeled as a sequential move game in which P2 moves first and the payoffs are (P2, P1). The payoffs to both players are:

Accepted Answer

A)  (9, 3). 
B)  (3, 9). 
C)  (2, 4). 
D)  (8, 6). 
E)  (7, 7). 
A)  (9, 3). 
B)  (3, 9). 
C)  (2, 4). 
D)  (8, 6). 
E)  (7, 7).

Question 9

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.1 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many trivial subgames?

Accepted Answer

A)  0 
B)  1 
C)  2 
D)  3 
E)  4 
A)  0 
B)  1 
C)  2 
D)  3 
E)  4

Question 10

A solution to a multistage game may be arrived at through:

Accepted Answer

A)  Deductive reasoning. 
B)  Inductive reasoning. 
C)  Backward induction. 
D)  Simplex method. 
E)  Maximin analysis. 
A)  Deductive reasoning. 
B)  Inductive reasoning. 
C)  Backward induction. 
D)  Simplex method. 
E)  Maximin analysis.

Question 11

In the case study "Sun Country versus Northwest Airlines," Sun Country's error was:

Accepted Answer

A)  Failing to use backward induction. 
B)  Ignoring Northwest's possible reaction to its decision begin regularly scheduled nonstop service to Boston, New York, Washington, D. C., Los Angeles, and seven other destinations. 
C)  Assuming that Northwest would continue to charge competitive prices. 
D)  Answers b and c are correct. 
E)  All of the above. 
A)  Failing to use backward induction. 
B)  Ignoring Northwest's possible reaction to its decision begin regularly scheduled nonstop service to Boston, New York, Washington, D. C., Los Angeles, and seven other destinations. 
C)  Assuming that Northwest would continue to charge competitive prices. 
D)  Answers b and c are correct. 
E)  All of the above.

Question 12

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.2 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many trivial subgames?

Accepted Answer

A)  0 
B)  1 
C)  2 
D)  3 
E)  4 
A)  0 
B)  1 
C)  2 
D)  3 
E)  4

Question 13

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.6 is modeled as a sequential move game in which P1 moves first and the payoffs are (P2, P1). The payoffs to both players are:

Accepted Answer

A)  (3, 9). 
B)  (4, 2). 
C)  (9, 3). 
D)  (8, 4). 
E)  (7, 7). 
A)  (3, 9). 
B)  (4, 2). 
C)  (9, 3). 
D)  (8, 4). 
E)  (7, 7).

Question 14

-In the game depicted in Figure 11.7, what is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game?
I. {A1, B1}.
II. {A3, B1}.
III. {A3, B3}.
IV. {A2, B3}.
V. {A2, B2}.
Which of the following is correct?

Accepted Answer

A)  I only. 
B)  II only. 
C)  III only. 
D)  I and IV only. 
E)  II and V only. 
A)  I only. 
B)  II only. 
C)  III only. 
D)  I and IV only. 
E)  II and V only.

Question 15

A subgame-perfect equilibrium is:

Accepted Answer

A)  An equilibrium to a multistage game. 
B)  A Nash equilibrium. 
C)  A equilibrium strategy profile in which no player can improve upon his or her payoff by switching strategies at any stage of a multistage game. 
D)  All of the above. 
E)  None of the above. 
A)  An equilibrium to a multistage game. 
B)  A Nash equilibrium. 
C)  A equilibrium strategy profile in which no player can improve upon his or her payoff by switching strategies at any stage of a multistage game. 
D)  All of the above. 
E)  None of the above.

Question 16

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.1 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many subgames?

Accepted Answer

A)  0 
B)  1 
C)  2 
D)  3 
E)  4 
A)  0 
B)  1 
C)  2 
D)  3 
E)  4

Question 17

A subgame equilibrium:

Accepted Answer

A)  Is the solution to a trivial subgame. 
B)  Is the solution to a proper subgame. 
C)  Is a unique Nash equilibrium for a dynamic game. 
D)  Is always unique. 
E)  None of the above. 
A)  Is the solution to a trivial subgame. 
B)  Is the solution to a proper subgame. 
C)  Is a unique Nash equilibrium for a dynamic game. 
D)  Is always unique. 
E)  None of the above.

Question 18

Terminal nodes:

Accepted Answer

A)  Designate the end of a multistage game. 
B)  Identifies a player's move at any stage of a multistage game. 
C)  Are the same as subroots. 
D)  Are Nash equilibria. 
E)  None of the above. 
A)  Designate the end of a multistage game. 
B)  Identifies a player's move at any stage of a multistage game. 
C)  Are the same as subroots. 
D)  Are Nash equilibria. 
E)  None of the above.

Question 19

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.7 is modeled as a sequential move game with Player B moving first and the payoffs are (Player A, Player B). The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

Accepted Answer

A)  {B3 6 A3} 
B)  {B2 6 A1} 
C)  {B1 6 A3} 
D)  {B3 6 A2} 
E)  None of the above. 
A)  {B3 6 A3} 
B)  {B2 6 A1} 
C)  {B1 6 A3} 
D)  {B3 6 A2} 
E)  None of the above.

Question 20

-In the game depicted in Figure 11.6, which of the following strategy profiles is a Nash equilibrium:
I. {A, D}.
II. {A, F}.
III. {B, E}.
IV. {C, F}.
V. {C, D}.
Which of the following is correct?

Accepted Answer

A)  I only. 
B)  II only. 
C)  III only. 
D)  III and IV only. 
E)  II and V only. 
A)  I only. 
B)  II only. 
C)  III only. 
D)  III and IV only. 
E)  II and V only.

A decision node:

-Consider game depicted in Figure 11.3 in which Left moves first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.7 is modeled as a sequential move game with Player A moving first and the payoffs are (Player A, Player B). The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

-Consider the one-time, noncooperative, static game depicted in Figure 11.6. If larger payoffs are preferred, which player has a strictly dominant strategy?

A subgame-perfect equilibrium:

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.7 is modeled as a sequential move game with Player A moving first and the payoffs are (Player A, Player B). The payoffs for this game are:

-Consider game depicted in Figure 11.3 in which Left moves first. This multistage game has how many proper subgames?

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.6 is modeled as a sequential move game in which P2 moves first and the payoffs are (P2, P1). The payoffs to both players are:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.1 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many trivial subgames?

A solution to a multistage game may be arrived at through:

In the case study "Sun Country versus Northwest Airlines," Sun Country's error was:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.2 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many trivial subgames?

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.6 is modeled as a sequential move game in which P1 moves first and the payoffs are (P2, P1). The payoffs to both players are:

-In the game depicted in Figure 11.7, what is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game? I. {A1, B1}. II. {A3, B1}. III. {A3, B3}. IV. {A2, B3}. V. {A2, B2}. Which of the following is correct?

A subgame-perfect equilibrium is:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.1 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many subgames?

A subgame equilibrium:

Terminal nodes:

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.7 is modeled as a sequential move game with Player B moving first and the payoffs are (Player A, Player B). The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

-In the game depicted in Figure 11.6, which of the following strategy profiles is a Nash equilibrium: I. {A, D}. II. {A, F}. III. {B, E}. IV. {C, F}. V. {C, D}. Which of the following is correct?

Introduction to Game Theory

Noncooperative, One-Time, Static Games

Focal-Point and Evolutionary Equilibria

Infinitely-Repeated, Static Games

Finitely-Repeated, Static Games

Mixing Pure Strategies

Static Games With Continuous Strategies

Imperfect Competition

Perfect Competition and Monopoly

Strategic Trade Policy

Bargaining

Pure Strategies With Uncertain Payoffs

Torts and Contracts

Auctions

Dynamic Games With Incomplete Information

Filters

Exam 11: Dynamic Games With Complete

A decision node:

-Consider game depicted in Figure 11.3 in which Left moves first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.7 is modeled as a sequential move game with Player A moving first and the payoffs are (Player A, Player B). The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

-Consider the one-time, noncooperative, static game depicted in Figure 11.6. If larger payoffs are preferred, which player has a strictly dominant strategy?

A subgame-perfect equilibrium:

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.7 is modeled as a sequential move game with Player A moving first and the payoffs are (Player A, Player B). The payoffs for this game are:

-Consider game depicted in Figure 11.3 in which Left moves first. This multistage game has how many proper subgames?

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.6 is modeled as a sequential move game in which P2 moves first and the payoffs are (P2, P1). The payoffs to both players are:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.1 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many trivial subgames?

A solution to a multistage game may be arrived at through:

In the case study "Sun Country versus Northwest Airlines," Sun Country's error was:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.2 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many trivial subgames?

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.6 is modeled as a sequential move game in which P1 moves first and the payoffs are (P2, P1). The payoffs to both players are:

-In the game depicted in Figure 11.7, what is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game? I. {A1, B1}. II. {A3, B1}. III. {A3, B3}. IV. {A2, B3}. V. {A2, B2}. Which of the following is correct?

A subgame-perfect equilibrium is:

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 11.1 in which player A moves first. This multistage game has how many subgames?

A subgame equilibrium:

Terminal nodes:

-Suppose that the game depicted in Figure 11.7 is modeled as a sequential move game with Player B moving first and the payoffs are (Player A, Player B). The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:

-In the game depicted in Figure 11.6, which of the following strategy profiles is a Nash equilibrium: I. {A, D}. II. {A, F}. III. {B, E}. IV. {C, F}. V. {C, D}. Which of the following is correct?

Introduction to Game Theory

Noncooperative, One-Time, Static Games

Focal-Point and Evolutionary Equilibria

Infinitely-Repeated, Static Games

Finitely-Repeated, Static Games

Mixing Pure Strategies

Static Games With Continuous Strategies

Imperfect Competition

Perfect Competition and Monopoly

Strategic Trade Policy

Bargaining

Pure Strategies With Uncertain Payoffs

Torts and Contracts

Auctions

Dynamic Games With Incomplete Information

Filters