Exam 5: Finitely-Repeated, Static Games

-Consider the oil-drilling game depicted in Figure 5.4 in which payoffs are in millions of dollars. Suppose that this game is played repeatedly and the probability that the game will end in the next round is 10 percent and the discount rate is 25 percent. What is the present value of the stream of payoffs from defection?

-Consider the pricing game depicted in Figure 5.5 in which payoffs are in millions of dollars. Suppose that this game is played repeatedly and the probability that the game will end in the next stage is 20 percent and the discount rate is 20 percent. What is the present value of the stream of payoffs by not cooperating?

-Consider the two-stage game depicted in Figure 5.2 involving two companies that enter into an agreement to maximize total profits. The payoffs in this game are in millions of dollars. The optimal strategy for both firms is to:

-Consider the pricing game depicted in Figure 5.5 in which payoffs are in millions of dollars. Suppose that this game is played repeatedly and the probability that the game will end in the next stage is 20 percent and the discount rate is 20 percent. What is the present value of the stream of future payoffs if either firm defects?

The problem with a tit-for-tat strategy is that:

A scorched earth policy is a:

-Consider the noncooperative oil-drilling game depicted in Figure 5.4 in which payoffs are in millions of dollars. If this game is played five times, the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game in the fifth round is:

The reason why a door-to-door salesman is able to sell a bogus cure for baldness, while the dishonest owner of a neighborhood barbershop cannot is because of the:

-Consider the oil-drilling game depicted in Figure 5.4 in which payoffs are in millions of dollars. Suppose that this game is played repeatedly and the discount rate is 25 percent. What is the probability that the game will end in the next stage will a player be indifferent between cooperating and defecting?

-Consider the oil-drilling game depicted in Figure 5.4 in which payoffs are in millions of dollars. Suppose that this game is played repeatedly and the probability that the game will end in the next round is 10 percent and the discount rate is 25 percent. What is the present value of the stream of payoffs from not cooperating?

The probability that a two-player, repeated game comes to an end in each stage is 2. When 2 = 0, this game may be treated as:

-Consider the pricing game depicted in Figure 5.5 in which the payoffs are in millions of dollars. If this game is played three times, the Nash equilibrium strategy profile in the second stage is:

A player who can credibly commit to a strategy before a rival:

-Consider the two-stage game depicted in Figure 5.3 involving two companies that enter into an agreement to maximize total profits. The payoffs in this game are in millions of dollars. Gold's optimal strategy is to:

-Consider the oil-drilling game depicted in Figure 5.4 in which payoffs are in millions of dollars. Suppose that this game is played repeatedly and the probability that the game will end in the next round is 15 percent. At what discount rate are the players indifferent between cooperating and defecting?

-Consider the oil-drilling game depicted in Figure 5.4 in which payoffs are in millions of dollars. Suppose that this game is played repeatedly and the probability that the game will be played in the next round is 20 percent. At what discount rate are the players indifferent between cooperating and defecting?

-Consider the pricing game depicted in Figure 5.5 in which payoffs are in millions of dollars. Suppose that this game is played repeatedly and the probability that the game will end in the next stage is 20 percent and the discount rate is 20 percent. What is the present value of the stream of payoffs by cooperating?

-Consider the oil-drilling game depicted in Figure 5.4 in which payoffs are in millions of dollars. Suppose that this game is played repeatedly and the discount rate is 40 percent. What is the probability that the game will end in the next stage will a player be indifferent between cooperating and defecting?

A strategic move is:

-Consider the noncooperative oil-drilling game depicted in Figure 5.4 in which payoffs are in millions of dollars. If this game is played five times, the Nash equilibrium strategy profile in the second round is: