Question 1

-Refer to Figure 2.6. For what values of x is the strategy profile {Strategy 2, Strategy 3} a weakly-dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium?

Accepted Answer

A)  1 
B)  2 
C)  3 
D)  5 
E)  Cannot be determined on the basis of the information provided. 
A)  1 
B)  2 
C)  3 
D)  5 
E)  Cannot be determined on the basis of the information provided.

Question 2

-Refer to the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.12. Rah-Rah and 7th Heaven are convenience store chains that are considering opening a franchise in downtown Pawtucket, or just off Interstate 95. Monthly payoffs are in thousands of dollars. If 7th Heaven adopts a secure strategy and Rah-Rah adopts a minimax regret strategy, what is the equilibrium strategy profile for this game?

Accepted Answer

A)  {Pawtucket, Interstate} 
B)  {Interstate, Pawtucket} 
C)  {Pawtucket, Pawtucket} 
D)  {Interstate, Interstate} 
A)  {Pawtucket, Interstate} 
B)  {Interstate, Pawtucket} 
C)  {Pawtucket, Pawtucket} 
D)  {Interstate, Interstate}

Question 3

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.23. Which player has a dominated strategy?

Accepted Answer

A)  Groucho 
B)  Chico 
C)  Harpo 
D)  Harpo and Chico 
E)  None of the above 
A)  Groucho 
B)  Chico 
C)  Harpo 
D)  Harpo and Chico 
E)  None of the above

Question 4

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in depicted in Figure 2.23. Which player has a dominant strategy?

Accepted Answer

A)  Groucho 
B)  Chico 
C)  Harpo 
D)  Harpo and Chico 
E)  None of the above 
A)  Groucho 
B)  Chico 
C)  Harpo 
D)  Harpo and Chico 
E)  None of the above

Question 5

A player who adopts a minimax regret strategy:

Accepted Answer

A)  Is trying to get out from under a bad situation. 
B)  Is trying to minimize any possible feelings of regret from making an incorrect decision. 
C)  Is extremely risk averse, even when rational behavior suggests that he or she should adopt a strictly dominant strategy. 
D)  Will only do so when the sum of the payoffs for both players in a two-person game is exactly equal to zero. 
E)  Is usually afraid of his or her own shadow. 
A)  Is trying to get out from under a bad situation. 
B)  Is trying to minimize any possible feelings of regret from making an incorrect decision. 
C)  Is extremely risk averse, even when rational behavior suggests that he or she should adopt a strictly dominant strategy. 
D)  Will only do so when the sum of the payoffs for both players in a two-person game is exactly equal to zero. 
E)  Is usually afraid of his or her own shadow.

Question 6

In the text application "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly," Blondie's dominant strategy in the "ecstacy of gold" was to kill:

Accepted Answer

A)  Tuco. 
B)  Arch Stanton. 
C)  Angel Eyes. 
D)  Answers a and c. 
E)  None of the above since no one knows where the gold is buried. 
A)  Tuco. 
B)  Arch Stanton. 
C)  Angel Eyes. 
D)  Answers a and c. 
E)  None of the above since no one knows where the gold is buried.

-Refer to Figure 2.6. For what values of x is the strategy profile {Strategy 2, Strategy 3} a weakly-dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium?

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.23. Which player has a dominated strategy?

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in depicted in Figure 2.23. Which player has a dominant strategy?

A player who adopts a minimax regret strategy:

In the text application "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly," Blondie's dominant strategy in the "ecstacy of gold" was to kill:

Introduction to Game Theory

Focal-Point and Evolutionary Equilibria

Infinitely-Repeated, Static Games

Finitely-Repeated, Static Games

Mixing Pure Strategies

Static Games With Continuous Strategies

Imperfect Competition

Perfect Competition and Monopoly

Strategic Trade Policy

Dynamic Games With Complete

Bargaining

Pure Strategies With Uncertain Payoffs

Torts and Contracts

Auctions

Dynamic Games With Incomplete Information

Filters

Exam 2: Noncooperative, One-Time, Static Games

-Refer to Figure 2.6. For what values of x is the strategy profile {Strategy 2, Strategy 3} a weakly-dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium?

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.23. Which player has a dominated strategy?

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in depicted in Figure 2.23. Which player has a dominant strategy?

A player who adopts a minimax regret strategy:

In the text application "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly," Blondie's dominant strategy in the "ecstacy of gold" was to kill:

Introduction to Game Theory

Focal-Point and Evolutionary Equilibria

Infinitely-Repeated, Static Games

Finitely-Repeated, Static Games

Mixing Pure Strategies

Static Games With Continuous Strategies

Imperfect Competition

Perfect Competition and Monopoly

Strategic Trade Policy

Dynamic Games With Complete

Bargaining

Pure Strategies With Uncertain Payoffs

Torts and Contracts

Auctions

Dynamic Games With Incomplete Information

Filters